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THESIS . 
There were no commercial banks m America during the 
Colonial period. The so-called banks of this period existed 
merely for the purpose of issuing notes and were not com-
mercial in character. The first real bank to be established 
was the Bank of North America, chartered in 178r. This 
tardy rise of banking institutions was due to the peculiar 
conditions of colonial trade and industry. Commercial bank-
ing institutions did not arise until there was a change in these 
conditions which made the rise and growth of banks neces-
ary, and when they did ari e, commercial banking developeu 
in compliance with trade requirements. 
I. 
THE CONCEPTION OF BANKS AND BANKING 
DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD. 
The early ettlements in America, like all new agricultural 
communities. were deficient in capital. The colonists knew 
that they required something for the development of their 
t rade and natural re ources which they did not possess, but 
their attempts to supply this deficiency show that they did 
not clearly understand their need. Their need wa capital, 
but they fell into the error common to person posse ing 
land in a new country. They thought what they needed was 
merely more money, and accordingly, instead of establishing 
agencies w.hich might. have enabled them to make the be t 
and most systematic use of the limited capital and credit 
which they did po sess, they resorted to what eemed to them 
a much ea ier cour e, the i sue of paper money. 
In some respects their course was at first a natural one. 
There was a real need of a larger medium of exchange. This 
need, which continued to be felt to a greater or le degree 
during the whole colonial period, was, it i true aggravated 
by the exce sive issue of paper money, but nevertheless, it 
was a natural and real need. Metallic money is an expen ive 
medium of exchange and new ettlers on account of the nece -
.:;ity of employing all their capital productively are very loath 
to invest even a part of it in hard money, which i only a tool 
of exchange. irculating notes are much cheaper. and pro-
viding their Yalue can be a ured, may to orne extent, up-
ply the need for money in dome tic operation . The colo-
ni t therefore resorted to the issue of paper money, and it 
wa issued to ome extent in each of the thirteen colonies. 
Thi deYice wa , however, employed ''without limitation or 
judgment" ' O that instead of facilitating commercial inter-
course, it became it wor t barrier.* Dr. Dougla s, a Bo ton 
• 8umoer, lllstory. :;. 
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physician and one of the ablest and most energetic colonial 
writers on financial questions, wrote in I740 a strong argu-
ment against the issue of colonial paper money. He strong-
ly condemned the "infatuation of our colonies running head-
long into depreciating paper currency." He said that it had 
brought nothing but evil, and that the demand for paper 
money came from the debtors and not from the merchants and 
large traders.* This view is slightly unfair to the colonists, 
for the merchants, as will be shown, were often the promoters 
or advocates of paper money schemes, but the fact remains, 
that nearly all of the issues ended in depreciation and were 
productive of loss and disorder. 
The so-called "banks" established in the colonies were 
mere paper money machines, and were not, as will be shown, 
commercial in character. In order to understand the con-
ception of banking in America during the colonial period, it 
is necessary to study to some extent the history of the paper 
money issues. To the colonists, "banking projects", and 
"paper money schemes" were the same thing. Paper money 
was issued by "banks" both public and private. The term 
"bank," says Sumner, "was applied to the mass of bills pro-
vided for and loaned out at one time under one act of legisla-
tion,"t and the term was also commonly used to mean the 
issue of notes by individuals and private companies. In its 
strictest sense, the term "bank" was applied to an issue of 
notes that were loaned, and not to a public issue for the pur-
pose of paying government expenses, but this distinction was 
not generally made, and public issues which were not loaned; 
were also spoken of as "banks".t 
The colonial period falls, naturau y, into three distinct 
divisions as regards the nature of the banks established. Up 
to I690, the banks formed were private banks, issuing notes 
based upon land or imperishable merchandise; from 1690 to 
the downfall of th~ great Land Bank in 1741, both private 
banks and public banks were formed, issuing notes based 
upon land, imperishable merchandise, or specie; and from 
1741 to the end of the period, public banks of a similar nature 
• Douglass, 330. 
t Sumner, History, 5. 
t See note §, page 11. 
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continued, but with the exception of the Bank of Pennsyl~ 
vania chartered in 1780, no private banks were formed. 
The first banking project, to which any reference can be 
found, was in I652. In May of that year, the General Court 
of Massachusetts appointed a council "to consider all sorts 
of trading, and to consult about the best ways of improving 
the same" etc .. * and in the same year there is an allusion to 
"what has been thought of by any for raising a Bank" etc. t 
It is also k!JOWn that about the same time "for some years 
paper bills passed for paymelilt of debts.":j: Nothing more 
definite is known about this eariy attempt. 
The first "bank" in America about which anything def-
inite is known, was one started in .\Ias achusetts in March, 
I671, by the Rev. John Woodbridge: :i\Ir. Woodbridge did 
not succeed in establishing this bank firmly. It existed only 
a short time, and no bills were issued. In 1681 it was re-
established as a private bank of credit, by which notes were 
issued. A pamphlet attributed to :'.\Ir. Woodbridge, which 
was presented to the .\Iassachu ett Council in 1667, shows 
the nature of this bank. The sub tance of the pamphlet is 
well indicated by its title, which is, "A Proposal for erecting 
a Fund of Land by Authority, or Private Persons, in the 
nature of a .\Ioney Bank; or .\ r erchandise Lumber, to pass 
Credit upon, by Book Entries or Bills of Exchange, for great 
Payments; and change-bills for running cash. Wherein is 
demonstrated First, the necessity of having a Bank to in-
larrre the :'.\1easure of Dealings in this Land, by showing the 
benefit of .\Ioney, if enough to mete Trade with ; and the 
disadvantage when it is otherwise; and econdly, That 
Credit pass'd in Fund, by Book and Bills (a afore) will fully 
supply the defect of 1oney. "Wherein is related, of how little 
value Coin, as a Measure of Trade, need be, in itself ; what 
inconYeniences subject to. The worth a fund-bill, or Pay-
ment therein is of, & not of that Hazard".§ The plan and 
the arguments supporting it, say Trumbull, do not differ 
widely from th~ l\1assachu etts Land Bank of 17I4. ll It 
• Quoted by Trumbull, 7, from Mass. Records III, 267 .and IV, (1) 6. 
t Quoted by Felt, 33, fl'om ~Jass. Records; also by Douglas, IIlstory, 42. 
t Douglas. History, 317; Felt, 33. 
§ Quoted by Trumbull. 10. 
II Trumbull, 11. 
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wa a private bank not chartered by the colony. Ther_e is 
no record of how long it remained in existence, and but littl e 
i known of the extent of its operations. Felt makes note of 
the fact that it did not ruin it projectors. 
Th fir t chartered bank in the colonies was established by 
John Blackwell of Bo ton in 1686. The nature of this bank 
i · h wn by the propo al for a charter, and by the report of 
the acti n of overn r Dudley and his council, who approved 
th plan a pre ented without change. A proposal was pre-
nted "by J hn Blackwell of Boston, E qr., on behalf of 
him elf and diver - other , hi participant , a well in Eng-
land a in thi countrv ; a al o a Con titution, ".\fodell or 
Fram of Ru! and .rder requisit, and to be ob erved, in 
th erecting- and maintaining of a Bank of Credit Lumbard 
and xchanQ" of money - by Per on of approved Inte rity, 
prudenc ' e tate · in thi country, wherein uch a founda-
ti n i. layed for delivering out Bill , or giving credit on uch 
R al E tate f Land a al per onal E tate of goods and 
mer handize · not ubject to perishing or decay," etc.* This 
pr po. al wa. acted upon favorably, on ept. 27th., 1686. 
··upon con ideration of the great decay of trade, obstructions 
to :\fanufacture and ommerce in thi Country, principally 
cca ... ion d by the pre ent scarcity of Coyne.' "And for 
that it i not vi ible how the ame may be remedied unless 
ome oth r medium be approved than the pecie of ilver, 
\\ hich ,. ry injurio11 ly hath been tran ported into other part.,; 
hence. .\nd for a much a it hath been ugge ted and made 
appear to u , that the defect afore ayd may be upplyed 
' ·ith I ank Bill·, or redit given by persons of e tate and 
kn wn inte"'rity and reputation, which may pa with greater 
a. c and ecurity in all payment of twenty billings or 
abov , than monie c yned • And having pent eel and 
n ·idered a propo al, made to u by Jo·hn Blackwell, E q., 
' ' ' liberty i granted for the Director or Conserva-
tive of the bank to commence the i uing of bill , on 
" curity of real and per onal e tate, and imperi hable mer-
chandize''. J. oncerning the hi tory of this association but 
little i known. All that ha been found i a brief reference 
• uote<I by Fe~t, 46. and by Trumbull 12, from )fass. Arch. Usurpation, Vol. 
t Q ~ lb04}01r · Heferred to also by Douglas. lllstory, 45-46. 
uot Y e t, 4H. from Mass. Arch. t:surpatlon, Vol. 1. 
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made to it in 1714 by an anonymou writer of a mall pam-
phlet. " ur Father-; about twenty-eight year ago," it read . 
''entered into a partner..,hip to circulate their .. 'ote founded 
n Land • ecurit) .. tamped on paper, a our Province Bill , 
which gave nn offrnse to the Government" etc.* Thi re-
ference woulrl 111dicate that it operated a a land bank, while, 
a ha ht u1 :-. hown, the action taken by the Pre id n t and 
hi c< 1111cil permitted al the i ue of note upon per onal 
esta tL" and 1111peri hable merchandize. The a ciation con-
ti1111 d 1t" operati n. nly a . hort time, certainly not after 
the 1,; .... ue of the provincial paper m ney in 1()()0. Felt .ay 
that it probably did not urvive beyond the Re,·olution of 
T hg!). t 
. \ noth r attempt to f rm a private bank for the i · ue of 
note-; wa made in 16 , by a number of citiz ns of Philadel-
phia. The ~linute of the ouncil for February 7th., 16 
thus make note of the scheme: ''The O\'ernor acquainted 
them (the petitioners) that he did know n rea on why they 
might not gi\·e their per:onal hill. to . .... uch as would take them 
as money to pa. . a. merchant annually did bill: of 
change, but that it might he u p cted that uch a .· u ually 
clipp'd or coyn'd money, would be apt to counterfiet th ir 
bill . unle .. more than ordinary care were taken to pr vent 
it, \ ·hich might be their Ruine as well a · y P op! · that 
should d ale with them". t etc. It i n t known whether thi 
bank wa. e tablish d. 
The e few ca e.· c nstitute the known banking project .... 
in th colonic: before t The banb f rmed hefor • that 
tim were all of ne kind,-private banks, i .. uing n te based 
upon land and imp ri hable m rchandi. e. 
The tabli. hment of a public bank in ~[a. "achu ett. in 161)0. 
and lat r in . me f th other c I ni , mark· th· he innin oi 
another clas. of banks. and topped for a tim the att mpt t 
is. ue n tes by pri,·ate bank . The cca. ion f r th fir l 
• Quoted by F~lt. 4 i : bv Tn1mbull. H ; and by f>ougla .. HI tor)". 4ll . 
t Felt, 4i. . 
i Quotl'd lo , rharf W . trott. Tl! .. !!O :;. 
§ Th )Ja. a!'hu tt I. sue lo JtJ(\O wa. not R "hank." HPD arrordlng to the 
rolonlal con!'eptloo of thP term In It trlrtP. t n e. The note wer • 
not loaned, but m rely paid out lo the dl•bnr empnt of the rolony. The 
I ue wa , howHer. rommool.- looked upon a a b ok. for It performed 
the rhlef fun!'tloo of thP rolonlal bank. It lorrea> ed tor a tlm the 
amount of money In rlr!'ulatloo. Felt fpage 4(\J, re ognlzP. the fact 
that thl. I •ue wa• rommonly <'OD ldered a a bank. He allud to It 
a• the "pro.-ln!'lal ba'1k" of lG!lO. Trumbull rpage H) al. o ref rs to It 
a~ a publlr "bank of credit." and ay. that for a time th r were no 
attempt nt private banking. 
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public bank in the colonies, was to provide means to meet 
the expenses incurred by the unsuccessful expedi tion to 
Canada.* The Provincial Bank in Massachusetts was 
established in r6go, and the first issue of notes was limited to 
7000 pounds. Other issues followed, 40,<X>O pounds being 
"issued for the Canada expedition alone. i" 
It was expected that these notes would be only a tempo-
rary expedient, issued in anticipation of taxes, but being once 
tried they proved such a tempting expedient that there were 
repeated issues and re-issues.+ For the first few years they 
were promptly called in by the payment of taxes, but in 1704 
the policy began to be adopted of postponing the payment of 
the taxes, in anticipation of which the notes were issued, and 
"thus unnaturally", says Douglass, "instead of providing for 
posterity, they proceeded to involve them in debt". § This 
policy of the postponement of taxes continued for more than 
a quarter of a century, and the time for the redemption of the 
treasury notes was repeatedly extended, with the result that 
<lepreciation set in. This depreciation was due, not so much 
to a redundancy of paper money, but rather, as Douglas says. 
"to the impairment of public confidence in ·the solvency or 
good faith of the government." II By 1713, according to 
Thoma Hutchinson, the historian of Massachusetts Bay, the 
paper bills had become the sole instrument and measure of 
-commerce, gold and silver being entirely banished. ~ The 
bad state of trade and the general stringency in money affairs 
we:e .. eriou ly felt, and from 1710 to 1714, merchants and 
po~ittcians were putting forward schemes for remedying the 
evil · It was generally thought that an increase of paper 
money would enliven and reform trade and the controversy 
wa chiefly waged concerning the meth~d to be employed in 
• On ~c. 10th, 1690, a committee was empowered by the General Court of 
bassw1usetts, to Issue Immediately £7000 In bills from 5 shillings to 
caiamltles fatbs determined upou, "considering the present poverty and 
ad ua 8 0 e country, and through scarcity of mouey. the want of an 
ln:i te measure of commerce, whereby they are disadvantaged in mak-acco~resent payment as desired yet being willing to settle and adjust the 
ada) ~t gt said debts (The debts Incurred by the expedition against Can-
l!as 3 m1 ake payment thereof with what they can." (Quoted from 
. rov nee Records, by Felt, 50.) 
t Ilutcbln on, II., 1 7 and 188. 
l Douglass, 305. 
§ Ibid. 
Douglas, Illstory, 121. 
Hutchinson. II., l 7. 
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the is ue of more notes. Three partie were formed.* The 
first fayored withdrawing the paper bills and depending up 1 
gold and silver. This party was very small, and although 11 
numbered among its iollowers some of the most influential 
men in the ProYtth:e. among them :.\Ir. Hutchin on, its plan 
wa not eriou-..ly con idered. A second party advocated a 
priyate hank. ..There was nothing more in it," says Hut-
chinson , .. than i suing bills of credit which all the members 
promised to receive a money but at no certain value, com~ 
pared '' i th silver and <TOid; and Real Estates, to a sufficient 
Yalue \\·ere to be bound a a ecurity that the company should 
perform their en<Tagement ". ·j· This party wa very numer-
ous. and Hutchin on . ays that it wa made up generally of 
''pcr!:ion in difficult or involved circumstance in trade or uch 
as were po se sed of real e tate but had little ready money, 
or men of no ub tance at all".:!: This view is undoubtedly 
omewhat bia ed, a ha been pointed out by Trumbull,· 
for several representatiYe were in favor of the private bank 
and ub cribers to its stock, as were al o ome of the leading 
merchants and most influential men in the province. A third 
party favored an i ue of bills by the government to individu-
al who would mortgage their e tate a ecurity for the re-
payment of the loan with interest within a term of year . 
The intere t wa to be paid annually and was to be u ed for 
the support of the rrovernment. 
There wa a lonrr truggle, but at length in 17q, the plan 
for a public bank was adopted a the le er of the two evil -. 
• \ loan of 50,000 pound in bill of credit was provided for. 
The e were to be loaned to the inhabitant for five year at 
fiye per cent intere t, a fifth part bf the principal to be paid 
annually. The private bank party wa defeated, but althourrh 
for a time dimini hed in number , it zeal increa ed, and it 
exerted a trong influence upon the p litic of the country, 
until after the defeat of the "Teat land bank cheme of 1740. 
Th i ue of 1714 wa followed by additional i ue . The 
con equent depreciation of the bill in circulation, cau ed a 
eriou derangement of the currency, and re ulted in a great 
• ee IIutchlnsou, II., 206 et eq. 
t Ilutchlnson, II., 207. 
i Huteblnson, II., 207 and 20 . 
'l'rumbull. 26 and 27. 
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deal of uffering and want, especially to those who depended 
on their income for support.* 
The history of paper money issues by private and public 
bank in Massachusetts, has been treated so fully because, 
although the issues in the other colonies differ somewhat 
from tho e in Massachusetts the experience of Massachusetts 
' k" i typical, and exhibit all of the various kinds of "ban ·s 
re orted to in the colonies. All of the colonies resorted to 
the i ue of bill of credit, and the consequent disorders ex-
perienced in Massachusetts, followed to a greater or less · 
degree in the other colonies. 
By 1733, there was a general complaint throughout New 
England of the scarcity of money: t The issues in ~Iassa­
chu ett and New Hampshire had been r estricted to some ex·· 
tent by royal in tructions; Connecticut had little trade, and 
did not need much money, consequently her issues were 
limited; Rhode Island emitted bills in laro-e quantities. These 
b . 
bill depreciated, and circulating largely in the other colomes, 
cau eel a widespread disturbance of trade. In consequence 
of the e di orders, the merchants of Boston confederated 
and mutually agreed not to receive any of these depreciated 
bill · In order to upply a currency, a large number of them 
joined together and formed a bank upon a specie basis. In 
the words of Hutchinson, they "formed themselves into a 
company, entered into covenants, chose directors, etc., and. 
i .u~d no,ooo pound redeemable in ten years in silver at Ig 
.h1ll111g per ounce, the then current rate, or gold in propor-
tion a tenth part annually".:!: The agreements of the mer-· 
chant. not tu receive the current bills were soon broken. 
Further _Public issue by ~1assachusetts, New Hampshire and 
Connecticut, flooded the country, and the merchants soon be-
gan to receive the new bills. The 19 shilling notes of the 
merchant were hoarded, and· injustice was again cau ed by 
the depreciated paper money. 
For about ten years previous to 1739,§ the general court of ~Ia achu etts had been annually issuing bills for the char-
• 8ee Felt· Uutchl , . .. of ~lass'" l'ai·t 0181°1°· D 0 1. 1 II ; Bancroft, Vol. HI; Barry, History 
. ., ; ou.i: ass. ! llee Ihlul trhlnson, IT., 380 et seq; Douglass 
• utc nson, lJ., 3 1. · · 
The facts conrernln th hi A Hank. 
of 1740-4! . g e story of the rise and progress of the Lall<> d 
a ie taken from Uutchlnson, Vol. I I., unless otherwise state • 
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ges of the government. The redemption of these bills had 
hcen continually put o ff as long as po ible, and since royal 
instructions prevented them from going beyond the year 174r, 
that year would be loaded with taxe amounting to between 
thirty and forty thousand pound sterling. To pay thi 
large amount ~cemed impo sible, and there wa a general 
dread of wi thdrawing all the paper money from circulation 
without '-llbstitut ing ome other medium in it place. Hutch-
inson pr1•Jl•1sed to the general court to borrow from England 
upon interest. a sufficient u.m to redeem the out tanding 
hill ;; , thus preventing a contraction of the currency and dis-
tributi ng the burden of taxation over a number of year . 
Thi-; proposal was rejected, a larger number favoring what 
''"a" called the "Land Bank or ~Ianufactory cheme", which 
had been revived in 1739. ' 
::\o more provincial bills could be i ued until all the bill· 
that were extant hould be redeemed, but it wa believed 
that the royal in tructions were not a bar to the i ue of 
bill by private per on . The project of 1714 for a private 
hank wa therefore reYived. A company wa formed in 1740 
to give credit to 150,000 pound lawful money to be i ued in 
bills. Each per on was to give a mortgage on real e tate 
in proportion to the urns he ub cribed and took out, or to 
gin a bond with two uretie . The personal · ecurity of 
any one per on wa limited to 100 pound The ub criber 
or partner were to pay three per cent intere t annually, and 
were to repay each year five per cent of the principal um. 
Produce and manufacture of the province were taken in 
payment. There were about eight hundred per on in the 
company and the cheme had many supporter , both in the 
legi lature and among the people. o many of the repre en-
tative-; for 1740 were either ub criber to the scheme, r 
its hearty upporter , that the legi lature for that year i 
kn wn a the "Land Bank Hou e." 
The Land Bank of 1740-41 began operation without a 
charter. A plan of the bank was pre ented to the Council 
o that it might be recorded in the ecretary' office but the 
council voted that "after their expre ed di approbation of 
the company a promotin fraud, it i an indignity to their 
body for uch a reque_t to be made, and they direct the ec-
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retary to return the document."* The libe)ral provisions 
which the Company had taken unto itself, of issuing notes. 
some of which were not redeemable before twenty years and 
"then only in goods at an arbitrary and unknown valuation", 
brought about the establishment of other banks upon the 
same plan. t There was great and vigorous opposition to 
these banks among the principal merchants, and as the situ-
ation was alarming, applications were made to Parliament 
for relief. The Land Bank Company, and all others of a 
similar nature were accordingly dissolved by the extension to 
the Colonies of the famous Anti-bubble Act. i This act 
branded the Land Bank as illegal, and effectively, though 
with a great deal of opposition, put an end to this kind of 
banking in the colonies.§ 50,000 or 6o,ooo pounds were put 
out before Parliament interfered. A large proportion of 
these notes were issued at a discount, and as the act pro-
vided that the possessors of the bills had a right of action 
against every partner or director for the full sums expressed 
with interest, a great deal of hardship resulted. I\ 
After the downfall of the Land Bank, no private bank for 
the i ue of notes was established in the colonies until I78o, 
when the Bank of Pennsylvania was chartered by Congress 
to a si t in carrying on the war. The disorders of the cur-
rency in the colonies were, however, not at an end. Private 
i ues were prohibited, but from this time until after the 
establishment of the Federal Constitution the various colo-
nie '.and later. the Continental Congress ;nd the new states'. 
contmued to issue public bills of credit, with results that 
were even more disastrous than those of the earlier period. 
• F~lt, 102:_ trom Massachusetts Provincial Records. 
t While, 200; Sumner, Illstory, 10; Felt 10~ l ln March, 17 41. ' " 
§ White, 257. 
1 lt t~~~e 8Q~Mmber of yea~s to wind up the atl'alrs of the Land Bank. A~ 
Ing that ·~tb SOth,. 117017, a notice appeared In the Boston Gazette, sta~e her b d e SUI v v ng partners of the late l\Ianufactory Scheme, a1 
or ~/ eslred (as they regard their Interest) to meet either In person 
on thePfi~xl, ~t the house of Mr. 'l'homas Bell. Innholder In RoxburYci 
ronclnd s ednesday of July next, then and there to consider au 
hath !oer on the most proper measures, for the Immediate finishing t~a~ 
motive maso many year been In the hands of Commissioners. I• or 
talked f. Y the partnen1 consider that another assessment Is warmlY 
able to~ th a~d how can it be otherwise seeing It would be unreason-
transact th~ iespecta?le commissioners to sit 12 or 14 years longer, to 
Mr. White company 8 a~~lrs without an hono1·able support." 
quarter ot saays tpage 2t>1 l that the llligatlon extended through a cen ury. 
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\\'e have shown the conception of'banking in America 
during the colonial period. None of the banks established 
\vcre commercial in character. They did not receive uport 
deposit the surplus funds of the community and use them in 
supplying the needs of the community. In other words, they 
were not banks of deposit and discount. Banking consisted 
merely in the privilege of issuing notes. The banks formed 
were of different kinds, as has.,been shown. They were both 
public and private, and were either land banks, merchandise 
banks or specie banks according to the nominal basi upon 
which their issues were made. 
In the next chapter we shall point out the change in the 
conception of banking, as shown by the institutions estab-
li hed, and we shall give a short account of the beginning of 
Commercial Banking in the United tate . 
IX THE CNITED STATES. 
II. 
THE FIRST COMMERCIAL BANKS IN THE 
UNITED ST A TES. 
19 
Although no commercial banks were formed in America 
during the colonial period, some of the merchants and public 
men were, in the latter part of the period, planning and work-
ing for their establishment. As early as 1763, the large and 
growing business of the port of Philadelphia encouraged 
some of its principal merchants to consider the formation of 
a bank.* l.forris in a speech before the Pennsylvania Assem-
bly in 1786, said that although the proprietary government 
"had no idea of a bank, the commercial men of the province 
had, and I as a merchant laid the foundation for one anci 
established a credit in Europe for the purpose. From the 
execution of this design, I was prevented only by the Revoiu-
tion.'"j- Gouge in his history of Paper foney and Bank-
ing, mentions the fact that a project for a bank about the 
year 1763, met with great opposition on the ground that a few 
men would be given undue advantages in trade, and even 
though the Revolution had not interfered with l.Iorris' plan, 
it is probable that it would have been vigorously opposed.~: 
The outbreak of the Revolution delayed for a time the 
plans already begun for the establishment of a bank. Com-
merce wa prostrated, and the energies of the public men, ancf 
to a la~ge extent of the people generally, were directed to-
ward v~gorously prosecuting the war. The difficulties in-
curred m providing means for carryinrr on the war would 
have been. greatly lessened, by the aid of a well established 
bank, as is abundantly shown by the later history of the 
Revolution. Congress lacked the power to enforce payment 
of taxes and the different colonies made but small and tardy 
returns on the requisitions made upon them. There were 
• Scharf & Westcott, Dist., III, 2086. 
t Cary·s debates, 37. Quoted by Sumner IJlstory, 12. 
f Gouge. 13. ' 
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no established agencies through which Congress might nego-
tiate either foreign or domestic loans. It had to rely \\'holly 
upon individual efforts and personal appeails.':' D:- the 
year 1780, the condition of the country had become critical. 
The army was poorly fed and clothed, and paid only in a de-
preciated paper currency; there was no money on hand to 
pay the soldiers or to buy supplies, and Congress was unable 
to do anything to allay the discontent. It was thought that 
every possible n1eans of raising funds had been tried and the 
resources of the Government seemed exhau ted. Something 
had to be clone at once if the war were to be continued. 
It was at the time of such gloomy and discouraging pros-
pects that the ladies of Philadelphia raised by subscription 
$300,000 in paper currency;!· and other subscriptions were 
made to assist in obtaining recruits and supplies. This idea 
spread, and brought about the establishment in July of the 
Bank of Pennsylvania, by a number of patriotic persons who 
subscribed 300,000 pounds Pennsylvania currency in 1·eal 
money for the purpose of supplying and transporting food 
to the army. This plan was proposed at a meeting in Phila-
delphia on June 17th., 178o, and within a few days the sub-
scriptions were all made. Ninety-two persons in all, pledg-
ing themselves for amounts varying from one to ten thou-
sand pounds, signed the subscription list,:!: The heading of 
this list shows the object of the bank. "\Vhereas in the 
present situation of public affairs," it reads, "the greatest 
and most vigorous exertions are neces ary for the successful 
management of the just and nece sary war in which we are 
engaged with Great Britain, we, the subscribers deeply im-
pressed with the sentiments that on such occasion should 
govern us, in the prosecution of a war on the event of which 
our own freedom and that of our posterity, and the freedom 
and independence of the United States, are all involved, 
hereby severally pledge our property and credit for the 
several sums specified and mentioned after our names, in 
order to support the credit of a bank to be established for 
furnishing a supply for the armies of the United States."§ 
• For good accounts of the financial difficulties of the Revolution, see Sum-
ner, Financier and Finances of the Revolution ; hlcMaster; White. 
t Jn May, 1780. 
i The fist with names and amounts subscribed given In Lewis, 19. 
§ Quoted bv Lewis, 19, from 2 Ilazzard's Historical Heglster, 260. 
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I 11is shows clearly that the object was a patriotic one, and 
11 , it commercial. Ten per cent of the subscriptions were to 
ic paid in at once. the remainder in in tallments as needed . 
. \ n organization \\'a" fo rmed with the title of the "Pennsyl-
Yania Bank'' and officers elected, who were authorized to 
horrow money and to issue notes bearing intcre t at the rate 
of six per cent. . \11 money received by the bank, were to 
be used solely in supplying the need of the army and in di -
charging the notes and expenses of the bank. It wa ex-
pected that Congres would gradually, as it wa able, repay 
all the money advanced, after which the bank hould call 
in its notes and wind up its bu ine . It began operations on 
July 1 ith., after having received the official recognition and 
·anction of ongre , remained open about a year and a half, 
and was finally wound up in 17 4.* 
It will be seen that the Penn ylvania Dank wa not a 
bank in the modern en e of the term any more than the 
banks described in the foregoing chapter. It wa organized 
for a special purpo e, and all of its fund were u ed to that 
purpose, and not loaned. The money depo ited or lodged in 
the hank was not subject to check at any time, but wa bor-
rowed for a specific time not exceeding i: month . Hamil-
ton spoke of the bank a "not an in titution, but only a par-
ticular subscription for a particular purpo e,"·j· and :\Iorri 
de cribed it a "in fact nothing 111 re than a patriotic ub-
scription of continental money, for the purpo e of purcha ing 
provisions for a tarving army."t Peletiah \\'eb ter, an 
able and energetic writer on colonial problem , wrote in 
Ii8o, that there wa no bank in exi tence in .America at that 
time,~ and other authoritie bear out thi tatement. 1  
It i to Robert :\Iorri that the credit i due of founding 
the fir t commercial bank in the 'Cnited late , the Bank of 
North .America, which wa incorporated by ongre , Dec. 
31 t., 17 I. Thoma H. oddard well aid, in hi account of 
bank in Europe and ,\mrrica, that "Robert :\forri may 
• For tbe history of the Hank of Penn~ylvanla, see Lewi•. 11;.2:i ; Sumner, F. 
& F's of the Rev., II .. 21·24; and Paine, "Dissertation on Governmpnt. 
the Affairs of the Bank, and l'aper Money." 
t Ilamllton, Works, I. 233, (referred to by Sumner F. & F.'s of Rev. 23). 
t Quoted by Sumner, F. & F's of Rev., 22, from Ford ~I 
§ Webster, 5th. Essay. 
Goddard, 49 ; Paine, Dissertations; Gouge. 
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justly be styled the father of the system of credit and paper 
circulation in the United States ."* The attempts that had 
been made before this time had come to naught. The plans 
of 1763 were, as we have seen, not carried out. It is believed 
that Hamilton had, as early as 1779, considered the esta~­
lishment of a bank, but nothing definite is known of his 
plans. t In a letter to James Duane, in September 178?, 
Hamilton outlined a plan for a bank saying "the only certain 
manner to obtain a permanant paper credit is to engage ~he 
moneyed interests immediately in it (a bank), by rnakmg 
them contribute the whole or part of the stock, and giving 
them the whole or part of the profits."~: In the same 
year he proposed to Morris, that a bank be established with a 
capital of 200 million dollars § and in a letter to Morris 011 
' . 1 
April 30th., 1781, he offered a plan for a bank with a capita 
of three million pounds lawful money. II This bank was to 
receive money on deposit from individuals, to b e repaid when 
called for, or passed by order to the credit of others, and was 
to loan money to the public or to individuals at an interest 
not exceeding eight per cent. 
Hamilton's plans were examined and considered by Mor-
ri ' who had been made Superintendent of Finance on Feb. 
28t~., r78r. He was, however, unwilling to attempt an under-
tak.mg on so large a scale, and drew up a plan of his own 
which, he thought, would be adequate to the national wants 
and more certain of popular approval.~ The plan for the 
Bank of North America was presented to Congress, ~ay 
r7th. , r78r , and provided for a National Bank with a capital · 
stock of $400,000 issued in 1000 shares of four hundred dol-
lar each, payable in gold and silver. Amon o- other things, 
t he plan provided "that the Board· of Director: determine the 
manner of doing business, and the rules and forms to be 
phursued, • • • and dispose of the monev and credit of 
t e bank for th · · d 
' e mterest and benefit of the proprietors, an 
make from f t · fi s 
I . ime o time such dividends out of the pro ts a t 1ev may thmk p . " " f the --:-;·;:~~:;:--~-r-o~pe_1~,~=an=d::.__:th:a:t~tl::1e superintendent ~
• Goddard 40 ---
-t · 'umner,' History 12 
_. Il amii ton, Works I . .,.,., 
~ llami!ton w k ' I --- · 
ll aml! ton'. w~~k~' 1lr" 7~. 
Lewis, 27. ' ., - · 
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Finances of America shall have a right at all times, to exa-
mine into the affairs of the bank, and for that purpose shall 
have access to all the books and papers."* After a lively de-
bate, the plan " ·as approved by Congress on :\fay 28th., with 
a recommendation to the several states that no other bani{ 
or bankers be established during the war.·;· The Ordinance 
of Dec. 31st., incorporating the Bank of orth America, gave 
recognition to the fact that the Bank would be of great service 
to the government and that "the exigencies of the United 
State render it indispen ably necessary that uch an act be 
immediately passed."~: 
The Bank of orth America originated primarilly as a 
government necessity, in a time of great national tress.~ 
"I mean," said ~!orris, "to render this a principal pillar of 
American credit, so as to obtain the ~oney of individuals 
for the benefit of the Union, and thereby bind those individu-
als more strongly to the o-eneral cau' e by ties of private in-
terest."11 There was, however, another rea on, and a very 
important one for e tabli hing the bank, viz., in the word· 
of ::\1orris, "that the mall sum advanced by the holders of 
bank stock may be multiplied in the u ual manner by the 
means of their credit, so as to increase the resource which 
the o-overnment can draw from it, and at the ame time by 
placing the collective mass of private credit between the bor-
rowers and lenders, supply at once the want of ability in the 
one, and of credit in the other". The bank, wa , in other 
words, not only to render aid to the government, but was to 
be a bank of deposit and discount, an agency through which 
assistance might be obtained, in the development of the na -
ural resources of the country, its trade and commerce, " n 
institution," said Morri , "that most probably will continu~ 
as long as the United tate , 0 and that will become a useful 
to commerce and agriculture in the day of peace a it mu t 
• Journal of Congress, May 17, 17 1. 
t Ibid, May 2, 17 1. 
t Ibid, Dec. 3I, 17 1. 
§ Gouge In bis II !story of Paper Money and Banking, page 13. says, that the 
plan "would have encountered spirited opposition, 11 It bad not been 
brought forward as a fiscal measure, and at a time when neither the 
legislature nor the people could give It the consideration It d erved." 
R Dip. orr. Rev. XI., 37 . quoted by umner, F. & F's of Rev., II., 27. 
Ibid VII., 430, Quoted by 'umner, F. & F's, II., !!7. 
0 The Bank ls still In existence, having entered the • 'atlonal system ln Xovem· 
ber, 1 64 It was permitted by special act of 'ongress to retain Its 
former title without the addition of the word "Xatlonal." 
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be to the government during the war".* How well the 
bank fulfilled the purpose for which it was established may 
be seen from its subsequent history. 
The bank opened its doors for business on Chestnut street 
in Philadelphia on the 7th. of January, 1782. It began im-
mediately to receive deposits and to discount commercial 
paper, t and to render assistance to the government. 
"Without the establishment of the national bank", said Mor-
ris, "the business of the Department of Finance could not 
have been performed. From the aids given by this institu-
tion, the United States was able to keep up an army consist-
ing of a larger number of men than they had in the field be~ 
fore or than they could have maintained without these aids. 
The army was in every point on a much more respectable 
footing than formerly, and kept the enemy at bay.":!: 
Although the Bank of North America aided the govern-
ment to some extent by making direct advances of money, 
yet it was not in this way that it proved of the greatest assist-
ance in carrying on the war. Gouge pointed out the fact 
that this direct aid had been greatly exaggerated,"§ for the 
sums advanced by the bank did not at any time exceed $165,-
000 above the amount of silver actually paid into the bank by 
the government. II It was indirectly through its general 
operations as a commercial bank that its services were the 
most valuable. As J\Iorris stated in his report for 1785, "the 
direct loans of the Bank were not the only aid which it af-
forded. Considerable facilitie were obtained by discount-
ing the notes of individuals, and thereby anticipating the re-
ceipt of public money. Besides which, the persons who had 
contracted for furnishing rations to the army were also 
aided with discounts upon the public credit. And in addi-
tion to all this it must be acknowledged that the credit and 
confidence which was revived by means of this institution 
formed the basis of that system through which the anticipa-
tions made within the bounds of the United States had, upon 
the first day of July, 1783, exceeded $820,000." ~ 
• Dip. Corr. Rev. II., 375. 
t Lewis, 40 and 42 ; Sumner, F. & F"s of HeY. , II., 32. 
i Qnoted by Lewis, 49. 
§ Gouge, 13. 
II Money paid In for bank stock by the government. 
fl Quoted by Sumner, J!'. & F"s of Hev., II., 32. Paine wrote in 1786 (Disse1·ta· 
tlons 383) that after the establishment of tbe bank there was a sudden 
restoration of public and private credit. 
IX THE UNITED STATES. 25 
,\]though the bank had many opponents, it was generally 
recognized that it proYed of great service to the government. 
Felt notes that the bank was of such great assistance to the 
administration in improving the embarrassed finance and 
reYiYing prostrate credit, that "many who had opposed it be-
came its warm friends and supporters."* ot only was 
the hank a public benefit, but the effect of its establish-
ment nn business and commercial concerns in general was 
also "happy,· and immediate." ·j· Morris wrote in a private 
letter in 1784, that "the bank has cr.eated a punctuality here 
in such (bu ine s) matters as to render it a pleasure to tru t 
safe people in the course of dealings, and everybody feels the 
benefit of it,"~: and Thomas Paine in hi "Dissertations" on 
the bank in I786, said that "it o-ives a kind of life to what 
would otherwise be dead money," that it collects the scat-
tered urns of idle money and puts them into circulation.~ 
The people of the United States.were quick to appreciate 
and to make use of the conveniences of the bank. As early as 
1780. ''"e are told,ll it had become an almo t universal prac-
tice for despositors desiring fund and those making loans 
at the bank to accept a "bank credit" and draw "checks" upon 
it, in tead of taking actual money or bank bill . 
The early and continued financial succe s of the bank ad-
mits of no doubt. The first dividend wa paid in 1782, and 
from that time to the present, annual dividends have been de-
clared. In I/ 2 a dividend of 8)~ per cent was paid. 
The next year the dividend wa 14/31S per cent and the third, 
in I 784, wa for 13_0 per cent. During the next quarter of a 
century the lowest dividend declared was 6 per cent, and the 
highc t IJ.0 per cent, with an average dividend of 9 6-25 per 
cent. 
The success of the Bank of North America wa soon so 
well recognized, that it in pired the e tablishment of two 
other banks, the ~Ia sachusetts Bank in ~[arch, 1784, and the 
Bank of :\cw York in June of the ame year. An attempt 
wa al o made in 178-t-, to form a rival in titution in Philadel-
• Fett. 194. 
t Goddard, 49. i Quoted by ."umner. F. & F"s of Rev., IL, 33, from Ford ~ S., Il.,-3. 
§ Paine. Political Writings, 395 and 396. 
R l'eletlah \Yebster. Es~ays, 434. 
A list of the dividends of the Bank of Xorth .\merlca from 17 '.! 1:0 1 00 
Inclusive, Is given In the appendix to Lewis. 
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phia, but the directors of the Bank of North America skil-
fully averted its establishment by tbrowing open to sub-
scriptions 1000 new shares of stock at $400 a share, the price 
at which the first shares were sold, thus silencing the agita-
tion for a second bank by giving the projectors stock in the 
established institution upon exceedingly favorable terms.* 
Although there is abundant evidence that the bank proved 
a profitable venture from the start, very little detailed info r-
mation can be found concerning the nature and extent of its 
early operations. In the absence of any published bank state-
ments for this early period, we must rely largely upon our 
general knowledge of the bank and upon occasional refer-
ences to its business by contemporaneous writers. Peletiah 
Webster wrote in his "Essay on Credit", that "the funds or 
wealth of the bank consisted in, ISt., the bank stock, about 
900,000 Mexican dollars; 2d .. the discounted bills now in the 
bank and payable to it; 3d., the Cash deposited in the bank for 
safe keeping, and which the owners may draw out when-
ever they please; 4th., the furniture and utensils of the bank, 
and any small profits which may have lain over or arisen 
since the last dividend," and that "the debts of the bank to 
be paid out of their stock are, Ist., All the bank-bills now in 
circulation; 2d., All the bank credits or balances due to such 
persons who have deposits in the bank." t He says also that 
its cash account was in one year from January ISt. , I784, to 
January Ist. , I785, almost $59,570,000 Mexican dollars.~: 
We have already pointed out the general nature of the 
busines carried on by the Bank of North America. The 
quotations from Webster give additional proofs that the 
bank was actually from the beginning a bank of deposit and 
discount, and also give some idea of the extent of its opera-
tions. We know that as early as February, I784, its business 
had increased so much that it was deemed necessary to in-
crease its capital stock to $900,000, and that it was further 
increased within a month to prevent the establishment of a 
rival bank in Philadelphia.§ We know also that the bank 
must necessarily have conducted an extensive business in 
• Lewis, 51-53. 
t Essays, 449. 
t Ibid, 447. 
4 Lewis, 51-53. 
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order to declare such large dividends, for its profits were 
chiefly derived from loans and discounts, and the rate of dis-
count was limited so as not to exceed six per cent. 
The Bank of North America was, as we have seen, the 
first Commercial Bank in the United States, but it was not 
long before other banks arose in imitation, the first, as al-
ready mentioned, being the Ma sachu ett Bank e tablisher! 
in Boston in I784.* Very little informati<;>n is accessible 
concerning the origin and early history of this bank. It was 
directly inspired by the example of the Bank of North Amer-
ica, and probably conducted its business in much tl;le same 
way. ·j· Felt notes that the legislature granted the petition for 
the :\Iassachusetts Bank, "having watched the proceedings 
of the orth American Bank, and convinced of its being de-
cidedly useful to the community." t The amount of prop-
erty which the bank might own was limited to 550,000 
pounds.§ Another condition of the charter was that the 
Legislature should have the right to examine it affair .I 
Among the first rules of the bank were that no renewals 
would be made, and that the name of delinquents should be 
posted in the bank to avoid useless application for credit," 
and in I792, the Legislature restricted the amount of loans 
and notes outstandinO' to double the amount of "the capital 
stock in gold and silver actually depo ited in the bank," " 
all of which shows that from the beginning it operated as a 
bank of deposit and discount. 
The next bank to be established wa the Bank of ew 
York,** and it too, wa modeled after the Bank of North 
America. The petition for a bank met with opposition in the 
• On January 1st., 17 4, a notice appeared In the Independent hronlcle and 
the Universal Advertiser (Boston) stating that a plan tor a bank had 
been proposed and that subscriptions tor the same would be received 
at a specified place. The Bank was organized on March 1 th .. 17 4. 
t "Yours ot the 5th. Inst. reached my hands this day, and In answ~r 
thereto I must beg leave to Inform you, that the success ot tbe Bank 
ot North America hitherto has exceeded our most sanguine expecta-
tions • • • We have been written to by the gentlemen concerned In 
the Intended Boston Bank and our directors have returned the most 
friendly answers to their queries" etc. (Extract of a letter written In 
Phtladelphla. Jan. 27th., 17 4, wblch appeared In the " alam Ga-
zette," M,arch 1 th., 17 4, and also In the "American Ilerald" and 
The General Advertiser (Boston) March th., 17 4. 
:t Felt. 199. 
§ Ibid. 
II White, 313. 
Sumner, History. 19. 
0 Referred to by White, 313. , 
•• '.l'he statements concerning the Bank of New York are taken from Domett s 
History of the Bank of New York unless otherwise stated. 
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Legislature, but the mercantile community was so desirou:o 
of obtaining a bank in New York, that it was thought best 
not to await legislation, and accordingly, the bank began 
business without a charter on June 9th., I784, with a capital 
stock of 500,000. Jot only was the general plan of the 
Bank of ew York the same as that of the Bank of North 
America, but the business methods adopted were also similar: 
).fr. eton, the first cashier going to Philadelphia for the 
special purpos~ of procuring information from the officers of 
the Bank of orth America. The Bank began immediately 
to receive depo its and to discount commercial paper. Among 
the fir t rules adopted were that "Discounts will be done on 
Thur day in every week, and bill and notes brought for dis-
count mu t be left at the bank on \Vednesday morning, under 
ealed cover, directed to William eton, Cashier. But no 
di count will be made for longer than thirty days, nor will 
any note be discounted to pay a former one," etc., and that 
"money lodged at the bank may be withdrawn at pleasure, 
free of expense; but no draft will be paid beyond the balance 
of the account. '* 
The Bank of :;:\ ew York was from the first successful, and 
althouah the opponents of the bank ucceeded in defeating 
the application to the Legi lature for a charter until I79I, its 
bu ine teadily increa eel in pite of the oppo ition, o that 
it wa enabled to pay emi-annual dividends of 3 per cent 
from • • ovember I t., 1785, until 1 • ovember r78 , when the divi-
dend wa increa ed to 3\0 per cent for the previous six 
months.-'-
• Quoted by Domett, 1 O & 20. 
t .liter a state Issue In 17 6, the directors o( the Bank of Xew York kept 
two sets o( accounts. In fact organizing two banks a "specie bank" 
and a "Paper Hank," the latter doing business on' state paper, and 
using th denomlnatlCln pounds. ( umner, Hist., 19). Following Is a 
statement taken from Domett pp. 37 & 3 . of the assets and llabl!ltles 
of the bank at the time It commenced business under the charter, )lay 
1st. 1701. lt gives some Idea or the extent of Its business at that 
time. 
SPECIE BAXK. 
Bills discounted ....... . 
Due from Corporation ... . 
ash .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316,0 1. 7 
Le s notes on hand. . . . . . 53,266.00 
Capital , tock .......... . 
r'otes outstanding ...... . 
Due Depositors ........ . 
Profit & Loss ....... . 
~ .J.3,040.20 
12,'.!'.!'.!.44 
~.J.62, 1:5.87 
1,320,078.31 $318,250.00 
181,'.!54.00 
773 ,700.67 
47,764.84 
$1,320,078.51 
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Thi bank, as \Yell as the first two bank established, i till 
in exi lence. It \\·as re-organized under the Xational Bank-
ing system on July 6th., 1865, the ecretary of the Treasury 
permitting the fo rmer title to be retained, with the addition 
of the \Yon] "X ational." 
Other hank followed at fir l very lowly, for rea on that 
will lie explained hereafter. In the la t decade of the cen-
tury a rapid growth of banking institutions began, that 
by i802. there were thirty-three bank in the United tate 
eng-agcd in discounting notes and bill of exchange.* In the 
year I 78o, Peletiah vVebster e timated that the whole circu-
lating- specie in the country did not much exceed ten million 
dollars. ·j· After banks were e tablished they began immedi-
ately to exert a strong influence upon the circulating medium, 
and to take an active part in commercial operation . In 
1802, it \Va e timated by oah \\' eb ter that there wa pecie 
in the yaults of the bank amounting to twenty-three million 
dollar repre enting notes out landing; and that there were 
tweh·e million dollar on the book of the bank lo the credit 
of merchant .:i: 
l'.\l'ER D.\:\K. 
!louse & Lot 
1iueen t. . . . . . . . . . . . . £ ;;,'.?4 ,- 4,- 0 
Cash ..... .... ... . .... £11:i,373,-17·11 
:\otes on hand. . . . . . . . £ :?S,GO;; £ !l. 7G ,·17,-11 
:\otes out. ............ . 
Due Dep . . .. .. .. ..... . 
Pr. & Loss ......••.... 
• Xoab 'Yebster, uBanks." 
t Otb. Essay on Finance. 
t '·oah Webster, Banks. 
£!l:J.Ol 7,- '.?,-
£71. :?'.? ().() 
£1G.O:?Ono 
£ G.:?75·:? · 1 
£0S,017-:! 
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III. 
CAUSES FOR THE TARDY RISE OF BANKING 
INSTITUTIONS. 
JI 
\\"e have seen that up to the year 17 r, no commercial 
bank had been formed in the Colonies, and that after a begin-
ning- was made in 17 1, other bank prang up in imitation o 
that by I 2, there were thirty-three banks doing bu ine m 
the United tates. 
Commercial banking wa known and practiced in Europe 
long- before its introduction into America. The Colonial 
financier were not unacquainted with European bankin , so 
that ig-norance of commercial banking and it advantage can 
not explain it tardy appearance in thi country. It i nece -
sary to _eek ome other explanation and thi explanation i 
to be found in the peculiar condition of colonial trade and 
indu try . 
• \merica wa , throughout the whole colonial period pr -
dominantly an agricultural community, and one of mall, 
elf- ufficient hou ehold indu tries. Franklin ' rote, durin 
the onfederation, that the great bu ine of the continen 
wa agriculture, and that for one arti an or merchant, here 
were at lea t one hundred farmer , by far the reate t par 
cultivator of their own fertile land , from which they dre\ · 
not only food nece ary for their ub i tence, but he ma e-
rials for their clothing o a to need very fe\ forei n up-
plie .* Food, clothing, fuel, light and helter \ · re pr vided 
on every farm, and each member of the family from the old 
grandmother to the child of four or five year of age had hi 
part to perform in thi home manufacture. 
The e indu trie were in high repute throughout the 
Colonie , and were engaged in by the rich farmer a \ ell a 
by the poor, althoun-h the rvealthy and fa hionable had a 
great likino- for ' •earing apparel of En Ii h manufacture. 
• Franklin, Work , III., 393: .; 
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Every farmer and his sons raised wool and flax. performed 
the heavy labor, and made and kept in working order 1.he 
various tools and implements necessary to conyert those 
materials into clothing. The wife and daughters did the 
lighter and more dextrous work. They took the wool and 
flax and carded and spun them into yarn and thread. These 
they knit into mittens and stockings, or wove them into cloth 
and then made them into clothing. The culture of flax, the 
raising of sheep and the manufacture of wool were encour-
aged in every way possible, and contests in knitting, spin-
ning and weaving were often held, where prizes were given 
for the quickest and best work. The skill often attained seems 
remarkable now, at a time when household manufacture has 
become almost a lost art. Alice :vr orse Earle tells of one in-
stance where the sheep were sheared, and a complete suit of 
clothes made in less than a week.* Another case mentioned in 
her book also shows how quickly and well this domestic sys-
tem supplied the demands of the time,-"N ancy Peabody's 
brother of Shelburne, ::\ ew Hampshire, came home one night 
and said that he had lo t his mittens while chopping in the 
woods. Nancy ran to a bundle of wool in the garret, carded 
and spun a great hank of yarn that night. It was soaked 
and scoured the next morning, and in twenty-four hours from 
the time the brother announced his loss, he had a fine new 
pair of double mittens."-f 
This system of home manufacture grew from small begio-
nings, and gradually developed in response to the necessities 
as they arose. In r705 Lord Cornbury wrote home from 
New York that he "had seen serge made upon Long Island, 
that any man might wear; they make a very good linen for 
common use, and as for ·woolen, I think they have brought 
that too to great perfection.":~ By the time of the war these 
self-supporting industries extended throughout the wholei 
country and each home contained within itself "almost all 
the original and necessary arts."~ 
Under such conditions of industry, operation were so 
limited and of so simple a nature that very little circulating 
• Earle, 202. 
t Ibid, 262. 
t Quoted In Earle, 191. 
~ Bishop T., 415; Weeden JI ., 80:i. 
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c pita! was nece sary. From the beginning when a i · t-
aqce wa required to carry on their mall affairs, neighbor 
anc1 friends usually furnished each other with the neces ary 
l"ans and discounts. Gouge says that before the e tablish-
ment of banks, ' ':'den of reputation found but little difficulty 
in borrowing as much money as was wanted. The country 
capitalists did not then purchase bank stock with their sur-
plus fund s, but lent them to their indu trious neighbors for 
lnng periods. Little risk attended thi mode of lendinO', and 
it \vas mutually beneficial to the parties concerned."* 
. \ . the population of the Colonies increa ed and it becam·e 
more difficult to know readily who wi bed to borrow and 
who had money to loan, the need of borrowers and lender 
were still supplied without the a istance of bank . The 
nc\Yspaper was the cu tomary agency through which their 
need. were made known. "A certain person ha occa ion to 
borrow One thou and pounds 0. T.", read one adverti e-
ment in I753, "& can give good land ecurity for the ame. 
,.\ny one who ha the same to lend, i de ired to inform the 
printer of thi paper," etc.·;· . \nother adverti ement in 1750. 
gives notice that any one who ha one or two hundred pound 
to lend out on security, may hear of a per on for it at the 
Po t Office,:~ and in 1768, a Peter Thomp on of Philadelphia 
advertise for one Hundred pound on intere t, for which 
good security will be given.~ . \dverti ements uch a the 
foregoing, were common in the olonial new paper from 17-0 
to I8oo, and indicate that borrower and lender chiefly re-
ortcd to the new paper to make known their want . ..\fter 
carefully examininO' the file of the leading new paper of 
Boston, ~ ew York, and Philadelphia during thi period, we 
find only one ca e where anyone make it a part of hi bu..,i-
ne to act a an agent in ecuring and making I air. On 
June 5th., and June 8th., in 1769, John oghill Knapp, of. ·cw 
York, advertise in the • ·ew York hronicle that ca h v.a 
"often to be had n approved real and per onal ecurity to di · -
count good bond , bills, or note , and on bottomry", and fr m 
. eptember 21st., to the 28th., in the ame year he adverti e 
• Gouge II., 2;; ; ee also Lewis. I. 
t Bo$ton Gaz tte, April J Oth .. 17;)3. A. similarly worded advPrtf. Pmeot -~~" 
One Ilundr d Pounds. appearq In the Boston Gazette, ~Jar h l th., l • ""· 
t Pennsylvania. Gazette, July Mb .. J ii\O. 
Pennsylvania Gazette, Xov. 14th., 176 . 
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that "the um of £ 1000 and the sum of £800 to be lent out 
on good real or personal security in or about the City; also 
a considerable sum ready to discount goods, bonds, bills or 
notes, and on Bottomry; cash solicited on every to be ap-
proved ecurity as usual."* Knapp was a real estate lawyer 
and al o did a rreneral law business. His advertisements show 
that he al o evidently made it a business to act as an agent' 
in making and securing loans, but nothing would indicate 
that he conducted a commercial banking business, or re-
ceived money to be loaned except as an agent under the 
direction of his clients. 
Before 176o, America developed wholly along agricultural 
line . Up to that time and even as late as the war, nearly 
all their manufactures were imported from England, and 
there were no manufacturing establishments in the Colonies 
of enourrh importance to require much capital or banking 
facilitie . "It has been the principal cause of the rapid prog-
re s of our American Colonies towards wealth and greatness;' 
say Adam mith, "that almost their whole capitals have been 
hitherto employed in agriculture. They have no manufac-
ture , tho e hou ehold and coarser manufactures excepted 
which nece arily accompany the progress of agriculture, 
and which are the work of the women and children in every 
private family.".1.. The absence of manufacturing even in its 
rudimentary form wa especially a marked characteristic in 
the outhern Colonie .~: In 1767, the Lower House of Vir-
ginia in a mes age to the governor said, "Your excellency 
may well report, from your own sight and knowledge that the 
inhabitants of the province from the first to the lowest rank, 
are generally clothed in British manufacture, and it is very 
generally known, that nothing has been set up in this prov-
ince which deserves the name of a manufactory."~ Kalm, 
the well known wedish traveler, wrote of the Colonies in 
1750 that "no manufactures of note have yet been established 
here; at present they get all their manufactured goods such 
as woolen and linen cloth, etc., from England, and especially 
• New York Chronicle. 
t Adam mlth, Book II., Clo . V. 
i "In that part of the United States situated south of Pennsylvania there 
are no manufactures whatever." W. C. Ford, report on trade of 1791, 
p. 29-Quoted In Ueer, page 72. 
§ Quoted In Scharf, 5ifl. · 
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fr, im London,"* and Burnaby, an Engli hman who v1 ited 
this country ten year later, said that their manufacture 
\\·ere "\T ery incon iderable and nothing to de erve atten-
tion." i· Burnaby al o made note of the fact that the outh-
ern Colonies were particularly lacking in thi re pect. "The 
Virginians,'' he said, "are content if they can but live from 
day to day. They confine them elve almo t entirely to the 
rnltivation of tobacco, and if they have but enough of thi 
to pay their merchants in London and to provide for their 
plea ure. they are sati fied and de ire nothing more."t 
Attempt were made from time to time ( e pecially after 
the middle of the eighteenth century) to e tabli h manufac-
tures in the Colonies but the difficultie alway proved too 
great, and but little success wa realized. America remained 
up to the time of the Revolution, predominantly agricultural, 
with no capital devoted in any large mea ure to manufactur-
ing, in the modern en e of the term. This condition of 
Colonial industry has such an important bearing upon the 
main question under consideration that it i nece ary to in-
quire to ome extent into the cau e of the ab ence of manu-
facture . 
:.ranufacture did not ari e in the olonie principally be-
cause the natural conditions psychically, indu trially and 
economically worked again t their e tabli hment. The 
oloni t were immoderately fond of Briti h manufacture . 
o long a the relation with the mother country were un-
ruffled, the height of fa hion wa to ape Engli h cu tom and 
manner and to import their clothing and uperfluitie from 
England.~ The farmer and the people of the poorer cla ·e 
were, it i true, almo t univer ally clothed in home pun and 
material of home manufacture, but the merican dre 
among the wealthier cla e , wa carefully modelled upon 
European and e pecially upon Engli h mode . The Gov-
ernor, with hi staff and attendant official , formed a minia-
ture court in the province, and its influence pread through 
all the ettlement . The cu tom and tyle of the coloni t 
were al o haped to a large extent by the influence of the 
• Knlm's Travels, 459. 
t Burnaby, 712. 
l Burnaby, 717. 
Franklin, Works, III., 150. 
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mother country workinO' through intercourse or corre~pon~­
ence.* Engli h fashion papers had a large circulation in 
the Colonie , and . fashion plates and imported doll!' dressed 
in the late t tyles, were exhibited in the shop ·windows of 
B ton and the larger cities. , 
The wealthier families in the Colonies imported nearly ail 
their wearing a·pparel, and boxes of splendid clothing were 
brought by' every sailing vessel that came from Engla~di 
Hancock wa perhap the mo t particular of the Colom~ 
gentlemen about his per onal appearance and dres!'. H is 
letter book hows him ordering goods from his London 
agent with very careful instructions, such as two wigs for 
hi own u e, "fa hionable and of a lig ht color." and articles 
for family u e "Very neat," and "of the very best ki11c1. cost 
what it will' ,t and it i recorded that he was seen at noon-
day wearin,,. a carlet velYet cap, a blue damask gown lin~d 
with velvet, white satin embroidered waist-coat, black satm 
mall-clothes, white silk stocki1ws and red morocco slip-
o . 
per ."t v a hington wa also very exacting about his 
dre , and hi order for clothing show that he wore wigs, 
lace and ruffle , and the riche t of silks and velyets, all 
imported from Europe.§ 
Thi fondne for E nglish good acted as a great draw-
back to the e tabli hment of Colonial manufactures on any 
large cale. The Coloni t , furthermore, preferred to be en· 
gaged in agriculture, becau e they could then be independent 
and their own ma ter . Adam mith make note of this feel-
ing of prejudice again t manufactures in the Colonies. He 
ay that an artificer feels that he, "Is the servant of his 
cu tomer , from whom he derives his subsistence, but that a 
planter who cultivate hi own land and derives his necessary 
ub i tence from the labor of hi own family is really a 
ma ter, and independent of all the world." II · 
!though there were no ocial distinction recoo-nizecl by 
0 
law, different cla e were formed in the Colonies and social 
di tinction harply drawn on the basis of fortune, and the 
nature of profe sion . Liancourt observed that the mer-
• W eden, ,:l3:J et seq ; See also Earle, cbaptel' on dress. t Ilancock s Jett rs In Brown f Earle, 203. · 
§ ee Washlngton'8 writings and Ford. 'rhe 'rrne George Washington. 
Adam Hmltb, Book III., Cb'. II; ee also L1ancou1·t, l;)J. 
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chants. the lawyer. the physician, the clergy and the land 
'•wners who did not cultivate the land them elves, formed 
the fir_ t class. the second cla s included the inferior mer-
chants. the farmers. and the artisans, and the third class 
\Vas composed of workmen w)10 let them elve out for hire. 
He said that as soon a, po ible every one became independ-
ent.* Dr. Douglas made a similar clas ification and added, 
that "The second sort i generally our case'."·;· The landed 
proprietor or country gentleman occupied the mo t enviable 
po..;ition in the community, and with that ideal in view, every 
dependent per on strove to become independent a soon as 
po..;sible. This social prejudice again. t dependent occupations, 
and the fact that the population wa .• mall and the capital lim-
ited. the amount of land large and easy to acquire, and the 
unit of labor economically far more producti,·e in agriculture, 
made it almo t impo ible for manufacture to ari e.t 
Rice and tobacco, the staple products of the Southern Col-
onies. were not exten iYely grown in Europe. and the outh-· 
crn planter found a ready market for all they could produce. 
The production of the e "taple. in the olonies was encour-
aged in every way po ible by Great Britain. Their importa-
tion was free and unhampered so that the outhern product" 
could be directly exchanged for Engli h manufactured goods. 
The encouragement by England of tobacco culture in the 
colonies began very early, for about the year 1624 the trade 
in tobacco became a royal mon poly, and soon aften arc! 
an act of Parliament prohibited th planting of it in reat 
Britain.§ Xot only was every po ible encouragement given 
for the production of the e taple in the • outh, but the 
natural condition of the oil and climate were favorable for 
their growth, and the network of river made their tran. por-
tation mo t ea y. /I Thu it i . een that in the outhern 
olonie , agriculture wa economically the mo t profitable 
employment. 
The condition were not o favorable to agriculture in 
the Xorthern Colonie . Their product entered Jar ely into 
competition with the product of England. and traoe re tric-
• Llancourt, 169. 
t Douglass. Summary, 206. 
i Beer, "Tbe Commercial Polley of England Toward the ,\merlran <'olonle. ·· 
treats fully of tbe conditions preventing the rise of mnnufaetures. 
Pitkin. 127. 
Beer, 73. 
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tions prevented to a large extent a direct exchange for manu-
factured goods. They were, however, able up to the period 
of rigid trade restrictions beginning about I76o, to dispose oi' 
their products, and to procure manufactures by carrying on 
a roundabout trade, and there, as in the South, it was an 
economic loss to engage in m~nufacture.* 
Manufactured goods could be imported from England 
much cheaper than they could be produced in the Colonies. ·j· 
The lack of capital and the scarcity of workmen were the chief 
obstacles. t In I764, Lieutenant Governor Colden of New 
York wrote to the Lords of Trade in England that, "The high 
price of labor makes it impracticable in the Colonies to inter-
fere with the manufactures of Great Britain/'§ and even as 
late as the close of the century, Liancourt observed that cer-
tain manufacturers then established, were threatened with 
great loss on account of the scarcity of workmen. II Some 
of the most far-seeing minds in the Colonies realized that this 
economic dependence of Great Britain was not to their advan-
tage. Franklin, for example, in his testimony before the 
House of Commons in 1766, admitted that goods could be 
brought more cheaply from England, but said that it was to 
the interest of the Colonies to make everything .~ Repeated at-
tempts were made to set up manufactures in the Colonies, and 
to divert the attention from agriculture. In Virginia for in-
stance, re trictions were placed on the export of tobacco, for 
the purpo e of directing the planters to the production of the 
nece sary commoditie , by making the tobacco trade unprofit-
able. · 
In pite of these drawbacks, manufacturing would un-
doubtedly have gained some foothold in the Colonies, had it 
not been for the rigid laws of Great Britain forbidding them 
to manufacture for themselves, and forcing upon them her 
own manufactured goods. The mercantile system represented 
• Hee Beer, haps. VI., & VII. 
t "The high price o! labor In general in America, rendered It impracticable 
for the people tbere to manufacture their linen cloth at less than 20 
per cent more than the rate in E ngland, or woolen cloth at less than 
50 per cent dearer than that which ls exported from home for sale ... 
Report of Feb. 15th., 1732, of t he Board of Trade and Plantations. 
Quoted, Pitkin, 5. 
i IIutchinson, Vol. II.. 447 : Burnaby, Travels, 445 ; Bishop, I. , 323. 
§ . Y. Documents, VII, G12. 
II Llancourt, II., 312. 
Franklin III , 265. 
0 Ripley, 61; also see Pitkin. 
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the prevalent form of economic thought in Europe during the 
greater part of the 17th and 18th centuries. It exercised a 
dominant influence upon the practical statesmanship of Eng-
land until the lucid and convincing doctrines of Adam Smith 
began to bear fruit at the close of the eighteenth century. In 
accordance with this system the aim of the English statesman 
was to secure for Great Britain a balance of trade as favorable 
as possible, or in other words to keep the exports larger than 
the imports, so that the amount of specie in the country would 
increase. Manufacturing was becoming an important industry 
of Gre~t Britain, and one of the most effeotive methods of 
bringing in specie was to increase the consumption of English 
goods abroad. Consequently, the central purpose of the com-
mercial legislation during this period, was the development of 
markets, and especially of a Colonial market, for English man-
ufactures. 
As early as 1650, this purpose becomes evident. The navi-
gation act of 1650, and its extension in 1661 and 1663, provided 
among other things, that the Colonies should not be allowed 
to purchase in any but the British markets, any manufactured 
article which England had to sell.* It was, however, not suffi-
cient to compel the Colonies to import manufactures only from 
England, for if the Colonists were allowed to manufactur" for 
themselves they would cease to consume English goods, and a 
valuable market would thus be destroyed. The Colonist were 
therefore restrained in every way possible from manufacturing 
on their own account. They were on the other hand encour-
aged in the production of raw materials in order that the 
English manufacturer might obtain his raw materials in ex-
change for manufactured goods instead of by the payment of 
specie. 
In 1696, Parliament created the Board of the Lords of 
Trade and Plantations for the purpose of exercising a general 
oversight over the Colonies, of making them more useful and 
beneficial to England, and of suppressing industries which 
might prove detrimental to her interests.·( To this board the 
Governors of the different Colonies were directed to make 
careful reports from time to time on the conditions of the 
• The first Century of the Republic, 157; See also Beer. 
t Bancroft, II., 73; Ilildrelh, JI, 1\J7. 
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Colonial manufactures in order that they might be effectually 
destroyed. From this time to the close of the Colonial period' 
the rise of manufactures in the Colonies was watched with 
jealous eyes and regulated by the most stringent laws. T he 
House of Commons declared in I7I9, that the erecting of 
manufactories in the Colonies tended to lessen their depend-
ence upon Great Britain.* It is also interesting that Adam 
Smith asserted a a fact that the English merchants and man-
ufacturers engaged in the Colonial trade were the principal 
advisors of the greater part of the regulations concerning that 
trade. t 
The fir t notable regulation wa that upon the manufacture 
of woolens. In I699, Parliament enacted that no wool, yarns, 
cloth, or woolen of American manufacture should be shipped 
from the Colonie , or even laden in order to be transported 
from thence to any place whatsoever, under very severe pen- . 
altie , and it wa directed that the Governor of the planta-
tion and the officer of the Customs and Revenue should see 
that the act wa duly executed.:j: Another act was directed 
again t the manufacture of hats, an industry for which the 
::\orthern olonie showed an early aptitude. Through the 
influence of the hatters of London, an act was passed provid-
ing that hats could be manufactured in the Colonies only by 
tho e who had erved an apprenticeship for 7 years, limiting 
th number of apprentice in the trade, and forbidding the 
exportation of hat not only to foreign countries, but even 
their tran portation from one plantation to another.§ Other 
act forbade the erection of tee! furnaces, rolling mills, etc. 
An act of 1750, tated clearly the purpose of these later acts 
by declaring expre sly, that it was intended to encourage the 
importation of merican bar and pig iron and that Great 
Britain wa to be benefited by the exchange of her "woolen 
and other manufacture " for the bar and pigs imported. !I To 
uch an extent wa the regulation of Colonial industry carried 
that the oloni ts were not even permitted to dig for gold or 
ih·er unle they sent them immediately to England. In 
• Sharf, J., ;)19. 
t ?-dam Smith. Book ff., h. YIT. 
l ~chart. I., :il!); Bishop I., 3:!7. 
* ,,~!':J!ii \ 1 51s'l ~Adam Smith, Book l\' .. C'b . YII ; Pitkin, 11. 
Kalm, 046i'. · 
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ti n::; way. every ri sing manufacture in the Colonies became 
the object of regulation and re triction, and its development 
to any large proportions effectively prevented. 
The conditions and results under thi policy are suc-
cinctly · tated by Adam Smith. He says that England "would 
not suffer her Colonies to work in tho e more refined manufac· 
tures eYen for their own consumption, but in i ts on the pur-
chasing oi her merchants and manufacturer all good of thi 
kind they have occasion for" and further, in con idering the 
regulation concerning the tran portation of hat , wools and 
woolen good he says, "A regulation which effectually pre-
,·ents the establi hment of any manufacture of uch com-
modities for di tant sale, and confine the indu trie of her 
Colonies in this way to uch coar e and household manufac-
tures, a a private family commonly make for it own use 
or for -ome of its neighbors in the same province. "* 
The fact that the country wa predominantly agricultural , 
with no manufacture in the modern en e of the term, the 
manufactured good being upplied by England, and by a 
wide pread ystem of . elf- upporting dome tic indu trie not 
requiring a larO'e circulating capital and banking accom moda-
tion . explain but yet doe not fully explain the tardy ri e of 
hanking in the Colonie . The e manufactured good had to 
be bought. imported, and sold in the Colonie . There were 
large merchant and retailer carrying on thi bu ine s and a 
vast amount of capital must have been employed. It i incon-
ceivable to uppo e that thi branch of indu try could have 
heen co nducted without the aid of borrowed capital and bank-
ing facilitie . There was no bank of di count and depo it in 
.America before 178r. The intere ting que tion ari e , how 
was this bu ine carried on ? Adam , mi th give ome light 
upon this when he says of • · ew Colonic and f the olonie 
in . \merica in particular. "They have con tant demand [there-
fore ] for more capital than they have of their wn; and in 
o rd er to supply the deficiency of their own, they endeavor 
to borrow as much a they can of the mother country, to 
whom they are therefore alway in debt. ,The mo t common 
way in which the olonie contract thi debt, i not by bor-
rowing upon the bond of the rich people in the m ther coun-
• Adam :>mlth. B ook IV., Cb. YII. 
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try, though they sometimes do this too, but by running .as 
much in arrear to their correspondents, who supply them with 
goods from Europe, as those correspondents will allow 
them."* 
Thomas Hutchinson the historian of Massachusetts Bay, 
calls attention. with mo~e detail to the assistance of English 
capital. " ntil within 30 or 40 years past," he says, "me:-
chant and manufacturers in England shipped goods on their 
own accounts which were sold here upon commission, and 
though there was appearance of profit on the sales, yet, by 
the loss upon returns most adverturers in a course of years 
were great loser . The trade is now ( 17 49) upon a more cer-
tain footing for the people of England. Few goods are sent 
to be sold upon commission. The manufacturer depends 
upon the merchant of England for his pay. The merchant 
receives his commission and generally agrees with his cor-
re pondent, for whom he is in advance in the Colonies, that 
after ix of nine months' credit, if pay~ent be not made, in-
tere t hall be allowed."t 
This evidence shows beyond doubt that English capit~l 
upplied in part the deficiency in the Colonies, and that their 
retail trade was to some extent conducted on credit obtaine<l 
in England. In order, however, to ascertain the influence 
of these forces on the rise of banking in the Colonies it is 
nece Sary to know the extent to which trade was carried on 
b~ their aid, and the exact manner in which they were ob-
tamed'. The English merchants were the only ones who gave 
exten ive credit to the Colonists,:j: and most of the goods im-
ported were, a we have seen, of English manufacture. If we 
know the relation of the colonial merchants with the mer-
chant of England, we know the extent and nature of their 
foreign connections. 
In the early history of the colonies the mode of living 
wa of the plainest, and their industries 'were limited to agri-
culture, fi hing, and the household manufacture of a few of 
the. coar e t articles neces ary for existence. Those things 
which the colonists could not get along without and coul~ 
not produce for them elves, they imported from England. At 
: .Adam 'mltb, Book IV Cb ' ' II --
' llutcblnson, n .. 444. .• . . 
i Barlug, 55; "'eeden, II, 81 . 
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first this trade was nry small, and of little value to the Eng-
lish manufacturer and merchant, but as the colonist grew in 
wealth and numbers, the capital of England was more and 
more turned to the Colony trade, so that by the time of Adam 
Smith all other branches of trade suffered in con equence,* 
and in the words of that illu triou economist and hrewd 
ob en·er, Great Britain re embled, "one of tho e unwhole-
some bodies in which some of the vital part are oyergrown, 
and which upon that account are liable to many dangerous 
disorders. scarce incident to tho e in which all part are more 
properly proportioned." t To such an extent were the mer-
chants of England dependent on thi trade that they had a 
constant fear of disruption with the Colonie , and the expec-
tation of a rupture, " truck the people of Great Britain with 
more terror than they ever felt for a pani h Armada or a 
French Invasion.":!: 
It is impossible to a certain the exact amount of imports 
into the Colonies, but Engli h export tati tic and the. e ti-
mates made by men of the time give a fair idea of the amount. 
In 1704, the exports from England to North America and to 
the v\Te t Indies amounted to only £4 3.26-, and in the 
year 1772, the exports to orth merica and the \Ve t Indies 
amounted to 4,791,734 pounds.§ At the beginning of the 
eighteenth century another e timate place the Briti h man-
ufacture and European merchandi e, annually received fr m 
England, a amounting to nearly four hundred thou ancf 
pounds terling, and toward the clo e of the olonial period 
to three million and a half terling, II which wa nearly one-
fourth of the Engli h export trade at tho e period . Frank-
lin, in his te timony before the Hou e of ommon in 17 
e timated the imports of Briti h manufacture into Penn yl-
vania alone, at 500,000 pound sterling. 0 
Thi exten ive bu ine wa carried on almost wholly 
on credit. 111e goods were in mo t ca e imported and old 
before return were made to the Engli h merchant . l:p to 
the beginnino- of the l th century, before the trade began to 
; f~~'.11 Smith. Book ff., 'b. \"II. 
i lbld. 
§ Burke's ('onclllation with the Colonies. 
Bishop, J., 1~ . 
' Bishop. I.. 9. 
° Franklin. \Yorks. III., '.!:iO. 
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as ume large proportions, the goods were, as has been shown, 
hipped here by the merchants and manufacturers and sola 
for them upon commission, but by the middle of the century, 
the manner of trade had changed, and few goods were sold 
upon commission. The manufacturer in England looked to 
the English merchant for his pay, and the English merch~nt 
sold the goods on credit to the merchant in the Colom~s. 
After six or nine months if the O'Oods were not paid for, ll1-
e . ' 
terest was allowed.* Very long credits were often g1ven.T 
"Their annual returns," says Adam Smith, referring to the 
<Colonial merchants, "do not amount to a third and sometimes 
not so great a proportion of what they owe. The whole cap-
ital which their correspondents advance to them is seldom 
returned to Britain in less than three, and sometimes in not 
le than four and five years."'+ Although the English me.r-
chant attempted to exercise great care and judgment 111 
their advances to the Colonists, the severe competition in the 
Colony trade, made an eagerness in that trade which often 
re ulted in the creation of bad debts.§ As late as the 
middle of the 18th century Hutchinson was, however, of the 
opinion that bad debts were not more frequent in the Colo-
nie than among the like number of traders in England. II 
The leading merchants in the Colonies such as Peter Faneuil 
and John Hancock of Boston, got v~ry large credit on goods 
purchased and were usually very prompt in payment. U 
The large and well known merchants al o often recom-
mended for credit smaller merchants in whom they were in-
tere ted. ~ Not only was it possible for the large and estab-
li hed merchant and tho e recommended bv them to get easy 
credit on goods purchased, but many of the English merchants 
enc?uraged thi indebtedness, to assure the continuance of 
their cu tomers, and to give them certain advantaO'es in their 
dealing with them, and gave credit to the small emerchants, 
and even directly to the planters themselves, much to the 
• Ilar·ock made constant complaints to his London agents on account of 
nterest charged. Ile maintained that his extens ive business operations 
t ' ee wllaarr1a ntedBbettet· treatment. See letters 1;1 Brown Chap. X lV. 
· r ng: ruce · " 'eeden · · i Adam Smith. Book' JY c·11 • ' ' TT § Ibid. " · · 
II ll!Jtchinson , ll, 444. ~\ eeden, ll , 617; Brown. 
0 ee Brown, 52. 
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di,;comfiture of their larger custome rs.* In looking over 
John Hancock' letters. we find him often remon trating with 
his London agent - for giving such exten ive credit to all who 
apply. He frequ ently reminds them that he is "a man of 
capital" \vhose business is of great value to them, and he 
complains that his competitors, "Men of no capital" receive 
equal credits and favors with himself, much to the injury of 
his trade. ·i· 
The Colony trade was conducted so largely on credit, that 
the Colonial merchant , and the Engli h merchant engaged 
in the Colony trade, came to be absolut~ly dependent on each 
other for existence. t the time of the pa age of the tamp 
.\ct the debts to the English merchant amounted t everal 
million pound terling for good delivered.:!: which the mer-
ican merchants absolutely refu ed to pay, pleading a an 
excuse their inability, which plea the English merchant ad-
mitted a reasonable.~ The enforcement of the tamp ct 
brought about a suspension of trade, and petition were pre-
sented to Parliament from all part of England, tating that 
unless Parliament speedily retraced it teps, multitude of 
English manufacforer and merchant would be reduced to 
bankruptcy. Gia gow complained that the tamp Act meant 
ruin to them, since it trade wa principally with merica, 
and not le than half a million of money wa due from the 
colonists of :\Iaryland and Vir~inia alone to Gia. gow mer-
chant . II It wa the opinion in England that the di tre -s 
was felt more keenly there, than in . \merica, for the coloniai 
wareh use were filled with Briti h good for which they had 
not paid, and their general re ource were o varied, that they 
were better able it wa believed, to tand a u. pen ion f 
trade. 
The coloni t were, however, equally dependent n the 
Eng1i h merchant . overnor Pownall in 1764, wrote that 
England need have no fear of a revolt of the Jonie , for 
their merchants were and ever mu t be, in a great m'ea ure 
allied with tho e of reat Britain, since their Yery -upport 
• Rlple~-. 122. 
t Ree lettei·s In Brown . 
:t Franklin's \\·orks. III .. 7:!0: Lecky, III., 333·34. 
§ Dodsley's Annual Heglster, 1766. 
II Lecky. Ill.. :3:13·34. 
Dodsley·s Annual Hei:ister. 1766. 
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con isted in this alliance,* and Gov. Bernard wrote to th~ 
Lord of Trade in 1764, that the orders for strict enforceme~t 
of the trade regulations "has caused a greater alarm in this. 
country than the taking of Fdrt WiUiam H enry did in 
1757." t It is clear therefore, that with the exception of 
the agricultural and the domestic systems, the industries of 
the colonies were conducted to a very large extent on foreign 
capital. Not only were long credits given on goods imported,. 
but in marty cases, especially in the South, the vYarehouses, 
and even the stores in which · these goods were sold, were 
the property of English merchants.+ In many cases also, t~e· 
goods were imported and sold by English merchant or their 
factors in person, who remained in the Colonies in order to· 
be prepared at the proper time to take possession of the 
planter's crops, if prompt payment were not made.~ These 
conditions lessened the necessity in the Colonies of making 
the best and most systematic use of their own limited cap-
ital, and thus removed one of the most effective stimuli for 
the growth of banking institutions. 
The e conditions do not, however, fully explain the com-
plete absence of banking institutions, for although by far the 
greater part of the Colonial imports came from England,. 
till, in the later Colonial period especially, not an inconsid-· 
erable amount came from other European countries and from 
the \Vest Indies. II This trade would sooner or later, have· 
demanded banking facilities in the Colonies but here also, as· 
in th_e purely British trade, the watchful ;aternalism of the. 
Engh h merchants served to retard the establishment of 
bank · The English merchants acted as commission mer-
chan_t and as bankers for the trade generally. They received 
consi~n~ents from the Colonists and disposed of them on 
com mi ion. They al o received the . proceeds of consign-
ments to all parts of the world, and paid the drafts on bills. 
drawn by their Colonial correspondents to the order of the 
Briti h merchants and Colonial creditors elsewhere. Almost 
• Pownall, 25. 
t Bernard's Select Letters 9 
t Adam Smith, book II. Chap v · Bruce II 380 § Bruce, II., 332. ' · ' ' ., · 
Q In 1 i6l04 t:i5 olonlsts Imported from Great Britain goods to the value o~ 
' d I POtmds sterling; from the 'outh of Europe 76 684 pounds " 
i?tktif0 '.f9 tbt We t !?dies, ~89,754 pounds. Tbe;e figures' are given by.-Bruce II •33-• r~m Mel he,rson s Annals of Commerce III., 571-2. 
• <·38. Hancock s letters in Brown; Baring; and Weeden. 
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c1 cry ..-\merican merchant carried an account with some hou e 
i11 England, preferably in London. All hi foreign bu ine s 
passed through their hands and the proceeds of his con ign-
ments \Yere deposited to the credit of his account. Drafts on 
these accounts were often honored far in exce s of such a 
limit, the deficiency being covered on the trength of prom-
ises of further consignments or shipments of specie.* The e 
accounts showed ome very large credits. In 1736 for exam-
ple. the mercantile house of Loyd & Lane credited the 
Faneuils of Boston with one item amounting to £10,104, 
3 s. 9 d. ·;· The Faneuil often remitted silver to repleni h 
their account. One shipment amounted to 410 oz.~: John 
Hancock"s correspondence with hi London agents show 
very clearly the way a Colonial merchant carried on hi bu i-
ness. From this corre pondence we find that Hancock often 
drew bills in excess of his balance, and wrote to hi ao-ents 
to haye them honored.§ He also constantly ordered ilk , 
wines. book , etc., from European merchants, and referred 
the merchants to his London agent for payment.II 
The people of the Colonie were o in the habit of looking 
dependently to the mother country for all kind of ervices 
that not only was the banking for the merchant and bu i-
ness men done in England, but even their insurance wa for 
the most part written there. everal attempt at e tab-
lishin o- insurance companies in the Colonie had been made, 
but they met with little succe s, and it wa evidently thou ht 
better to obtain in England the needed in urance on ve el 
engao-ed in the tran -atlantic trade. The Engli h merchan t-
al o performed to ome extent the function of banker f r 
individual in the Colonie , as well a for the bu ine hou e . 
The e en-ice were rendered indirectly through the Colonial 
merchant . \Ve have een that the general operation of the 
C Joni t , were of uch a nature, that very little circulating 
• Bruce. JI ., 33 . 
t Weeden. 74. 
\Yeeden, 74. 
Brown, 67, 73, 77, 133. 
Brown, 0-94, 140. The extent to which these services wne rend red by 
the English merchants Is well suggested by an advertisement of 
foreign newspapers which appeared In the P ennsylvania Gazette, 
~arch 4th., 1756, as follows : "N. B. It Is desired that whosoever 
may have occasion to give orders for any of the above papers, wlll 
for convenience sake be pleased to mention thelr correspondents In 
London whom they Intend should pay for the same . ., 
See Weeden, II., 616; Brown, 50. 
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capital was required, and that the financial assistance needed 
could u ually be obtained from neighbors and fricnds . Their 
need for ready capital was also greatly lessened by the fact 
that the Colonial merchants gave long credits 011 goods pur-
cha ed.* The advertisements of the merch ants announcing 
new importations show that long credit was com mon. even 
though the goods would be sold cheap for " ready money or 
hort credit." Nearly all of these adverti sements ur~e 
payment from those who are indebted for "aboye six 
month " or announce that those indebted for "twclYe months 
are de ired to pay without further indulgence."·;· 
The merchants were usually the wealthiest members ~f 
the community, and they were looked to, not only for credit 
on goods, but for small advances of money and other banking 
ervices. The merchants were the bankers for the Colonists. 
One of the arguments used against the establishment of 
banks, was that the merchants would be deprived of the law-
ful gains of lending their money.t Instead of going to a 
bank as now, the colonist went to his merchant. who on 
account of his London Connections could make his foreign 
remittance for him, buy and sell bills of exchange. and per-
f~rm other banking functions. Hancock did quite an exten-
ive bankinrr business, as is shown by his correspondence. On 
~ctober 12th, 1764, for example, he notified hi s agents that 
mce eptember 24th, he had drawn bills on them in favor of 
ev~ral gentlemen, amounting to 3,668 pounds.§ . 
Ve have now shown the causes retarclina the estabhsh-~ient of banking in titutions in America. We shall attempt 
m the next chapter to trace the change of conditions which 
made the ris d 1 e an growt 1 of banks necessary. --
; ~.rown ; Weeden ; Bruce I 
·or 1~0t~e 1t2gbcal advertisements see '£lie rennsylvan ia Gazette. Aprl 
t ~k\Jaster'. i{ 3•0 & Jan 20th., 1763. ' 
§ Brown. 48 ; See . also Gouge. 
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IV. 
RISE AND GROWTH OF CONDITIONS DEMANDING 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BANKS. 
\\ e han seen in the last chapter that the condition of 
trade anrl industry in the Colonies did not demand the ri e 
of hanking- institution . There were n manufacture requir-
ing extcn-.iYc capital and banking facilitie ; th financial aid 
ncces-.ar: to carry on the operation under the agricultural 
and domestic y tem was upplied by individual in the 
( ">l()nies: the retail trade and the c a ting and hipping in-
dustries were conducted on English capital; the banking for 
the merchant was done in England; and colonial merchants, 
with the aid of their own capital, and their banking connec-
tions in England, were able to give t indi\'idual and ~ mall 
traders. the limited banking ervice and accommoclati n.-
which they required. 
The· e condition would probably haYe continued, and the 
ultimate ri e of banking in America been much longer de-
layed, had not Eno-land, by her per i tent and unwi e re · tri --
tion on their trade, forced the colonic to manufactur for 
themselve , and to engage in other more exten ive industrial 
operation , thu compelling them to make the be t p .· ible 
u e of their own limited and cattered capital at home. 
So long a the coloni t could di p e of their own prod-
uct to ad\'antage they were perfectly content t buy all 
. their manufactured good in England, but when Great Britain 
little by little clo eel her market to all product which c m-
peted with home producer ,-the very product with which 
Kew England and the ~Iicldle Colonies would mo t naturally 
pay for their manufacture·,-and when he by further act 
prevented the colonie from carrying on the round-about 
trade to which they had been dri\'en by the e re trictive 
mea ure , and which furni heel them the mean by which they 
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could still import English manufactures, th ey had no other 
recourse than to begin to manufacture for themselves. 
The first considerable impetus in the direction of manu-
factures in the colonies, was during the twenty-fiye years 
preceding the establishment of the constitution.':' T here were 
no serious attempts to establish manufactures on a large scale 
before that time. 
The policy of Great Britain towards the colonies in Amer-
ica was always to secure to herself the carriage of their prod-
uce, to monopolize their raw materials and to furnish them 
with all the manufactured goods or other imported articles 
which they consumed. "The only use and advantage of 
American colonies or West Indian Islands," saii:l Lord Shef-
field, "is the monopoly of their consuµiption and the carriage 
of their produce." t 
\Ye have noted some of the measures employed to secur_e 
the monopoly of their consumption, and have seen that until 
after the middle of the 18th century, these measures were 
almost wholly successful. The British restri ctive measures 
before 1763, were consistent with the economic doctrines cur-
rent in England, and although they brought forth great com-
plaint and remonstrances in the colonies, they did not cause 
any serious breach and the colonists did not, as we have seen, 
attempt on any large scale to manufacture for themselves . 
. The navigation acts in so far as they regulated the car-
rymg trade, proved beneficial rather than injurious.:!: They 
ga_ve . an effective encouragement to the ship building and 
h 1PP_111 ~, indu tries in the colonies. The policy of restricting 
certam _ Enumerated commodities" to English markets,§ and 
the policy of agricultural protection, which closed the English 
markets to the staple products of the Northern and the mid-
dle colonies, although they proved very burdensome, did not 
prevent the colonies from disposing of their products~ 
• Bishop, Yo! I 
~ ·~:m8~~~?servatlons; Quoted In Pitkin 2 ·s 
latlon gf•EThe Navigation Laws; a'nd ·Ashley, '.rhe Commercial Legi · 
§ The oll ngland. d 
iPn1y c~o 0fn~J~~er:~~n~ fe~taln commodities which could be s~ip~:s 
begun In 16"0 S a er to points south of Cape Flnnesteer ded 
In England ~nd co~r~ comt mbodltles were enumerated as were gt~~tes. 
The purp no e produced there In sufficient qua top 
trade wlt~seth~:: ~~u~~pply Ehngland with these products, an1dht~:nu· factures N 1 r es w !ch might compete with Engl s VY duties on l~ar y all of the enumerated commodities had to pay beare· 
exportation posrtatBlon Into England. Drawbacks were allowed on 
· ee eer, and Pitkin. 
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i· 1p,1rting British manufactures. \\' hen the market of Great 
I' ri ta in were closed, either ab ol utely or by prohibitory 
duties, to nearly all the products which the Tew Enofand 
' 1J!onies. and to a large extent the ~fiddle Colonies, naturally 
.rnd most easily produced,* they were forced to seek a middle 
market. This market was found chiefly in the \Vest Indies, 
where the colonists exported cattle, horses, lurnher, fish, and 
agricultural products, and received in return mainly sugar, 
111ulas-.cs. rum, indigo and specie. \Vith these products and 
t ht: :-;pecie obtained, the coloni t paid for their manufactures. 
The balance in this trade was favorable to the colonies and 
~pecie continually flowed in, only to be ent almost imme-
diately to England. Often the product received in the \\. e t 
l ndies were not brought to the colonic at all but were taken 
directly to England and exchanrred for manufacture . "By 
this trade," it wa said in 1731, "the -' rorthern colonies are 
enabled to make such con iderable remittances to Enrrland in 
ready money a they could procure nowhere el. e but by 
their traffic with the foreign colonie , as well as by indigo, 
cacao. ugar and rum, both from Briti h and foreign colonie 
in the \ \" e t Indies, for enabling them to pay for the great 
quantitie of our manufacture which they yearly take of 
us."·j· 
At first thi trade was chiefly with the Briti h \\et 
Indies, but a the colonies grew in wealth and population, 
thi market became too narrow and a lucrative trade prang 
up with the forei!m islands. Thi trade arou ed the jealousy 
of the Briti h \Vest India planter , and their dis ati faction 
<ffer the increa e of the foreign \\" e t India trade with the 
.\merican colonie , and the diminution of their own, finally 
gave ri e to an act by Parliament:!: in 1733, placing a prohib-
itory duty on rum, mola se and ugar imported into any of 
the Briti h plantations in .\merica, from foreign ugar col-
onic . If this act had been rigidly enforced it would have 
been impossible for the -orthern colonie to continue buying 
nritish manufacture , and they would have been obliged t 
• Prohibitory duties were levied on agricultural product• such as wheat. 
oat , rye, barley. peas and beans. Discriminating dutle di coura~ed 
the whale fisheries ot Xew England, and the Importation ot salt Jlrm·l-
'lons Including beef, pork, bacon, and butter was ab olutely prohibit•'<!. 
Beer. 74. 
· ;\fr Pherson. III.. 11;;; ouoted In Beer, 10 . 
.i 6 Geo. II, C., 13. 
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manufacture for themselves. The authorities in the colonies 
soon recognized that the enforcement of this act \Yas impos-
sible and it remained up to 1764, practically of no effect. 
Governor Bernard admitted this in rather guarded language, 
when he wrote to the Lords of Trade in I763, that "The 
mola ses act • I presume has never been duly exe-
cuted,"* and Bishop says that "It was only by an evasion 
or relaxation of the laws or trade, which was connived at by 
the Revenue officials that the colonies were ever enabled to 
pay for the enormo~s amount of British manufactures and 
European merchandise annually received from England." ·j· 
Under this connivance by the authorities, smuggling was 
engaged in by all, even by some of the best men of the col~ 
onies, and the act remained practically a "dead letter.' 
Thu , through the nature or non-enforcement of the acts 
themselves, or by the colonies finding external means of ov~r­
coming the difficulties, the restrictive measures up to the six-
ties did not break off trade relations with the colonies. 
At the close of the Seven Years War, in I763, a radical 
change 0£ policy was inaugurated, which made continued 
trade relations with England impossible and finally also led 
to a political separation from the .mother country. England's 
debt had been greatly increased by the late war, the debt 
being partly incurred on account of the colonies. It was also 
realized that the work of protection would in the future be 
more expensive, and it was thought only just and proper 
that the colonies should help bear the burden.t Conse-
quently it was determined to enforce strictly the existing 
trade relation , and to raise a revenue in the colonies from 
the molasses act, and other measures to be enacted.§ 
. It is unnecessary to rehearse with any detail, the provi-
sions _of the~e acts which are so familiar to every student of 
American history. The middle markets were destroyed by 
the enactment of the Sugar Act which lowered the prohibitive 
duties of t~e molasses act, and made it perpetual ll and placed 
heavy ~uttes and prohibitions on many other products im-
ported into the colonies. The Stamp Act and the revenue 
• Bernard's elect Lett t Bishop, I., o. ers, 5. 
t Bancroft. Ill 73 . A _ Beer, 146. " ' m. Archives, .:ith series, n ., 967. 
Bancroft, J II, 73. 
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111 a-;ures following, so aroused the spirit of indignation and 
I < !Jd 1 ion in the colonies that they produced almost a com-
pl ete suspension of trade with the :\!other Country. ·nder 
s·1 ch conditions they had to begin to manufacture for them-
~ elves and to supply their own needs in other directions . 
. \!though up to the time of the war, on account of the 
difficulties mentioned in the last chapter, very little real prog-
ress had been made in the establishment of manufactures, 
yet there \Vas a marked change in that direction. . r anufac-
tures were spurred on by necessity, and were encouraged by 
legislative acts, by feelings of patriotism and by social 
pres , ure . 
. \n international trade to be successfully carried on for 
any length of time must be reciprocal, or the country having 
the unfavorable balance, will in the end be drained of it 
specie. Upon the rigid enforcement of the trade re trictions 
after 1763, the colonies could not carry on a reciprocal trade. 
Gov. Bernard stated well the condition when he wrote in 
1764, to a friend in England, that "The produce of the dutie 
and internal taxes impo eel on ~'forth America are to be re-
mitted to the King's Exchequer at London and from thence 
to be dispensed to the service to which they are appropriated, 
and this method, it is said, will drain the American Colonie 
of all their specie so effectually, that their trade mu t be de-
troyed for want of means to carry it on."* Franklin also 
wrote in the same year that ''The balance of their trade with 
Britain, being greatly against them, the gold and ilver are 
drawn out to pay that balance, and the nece sity of ome 
medium of trade has induced the making of paper money, 
which could not be carried away."·( 
The tamp Act and the sub equent revenue mea ures pro-
voked a general feeling of indignation and re i tance in the 
colonies. Great social pressure wa brought to bear again t 
the use of English goods. Feelings of patrioti m overcame 
personal desires and interest , and non-importation agree-
ments were made in the outhern a well a in the • orthern 
colonies, with the purpose, as Hutchinson says, of alarming 
the manufacturers of England and of encouraging manufac-
• Bernard's Select Letters, 17. 
t Works, III., 145. 
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t: ures 111 the colonies.* Agreements were signed by the mer-
chants generally not to import goods from England, and 
agreements were made by the inhabitants not to purchase 
goods from merchants who imported them. t Orders already 
in for English goods were cancelled or conditioned, the same 
a new orders, upon the repeal of the Stamp Act, and there 
·was a general suspension of trade.~: Rich as well as poor 
dressed in homespun, ate no sheep in order to save the wool, 
and in every way possible simplified their life and manners 
to suit the changing conditions.§ 
Although, as we have seen, conditions were not such as 
· · t b k' · · · 1 had been t:o give nse o an mg mst1tutions, yet a c 1ange 
and was taking place which would soon demand their estab-
1 i hment. The stagnation of trade made it impossible for the 
coloni ts to pay their debts to the English merchants, ~nd 
t:heir credit with the merchants of other European countn es, 
which had before been inconsiderable was even less on that 
account. The colonists had to suppl~ their own needs, and 
·yery re ource they possessed was taxed to the utmost. The 
population of the colonies had been rapidly increasing, and 
the bu ~ne s of the country was beginning to assume lar~er 
proportions,-all of which contributed to the need of banking 
in titut~ons in the colonies. This need began to be felt in 
the bu mes centers and was recognized by the leading m~r­
chant · By 1763, business at the port of Philadelphia had w-
crea ed to uch an extent that some of the principal mer-
chant ' among them Robert Morris, as already noted, were 
•ncouraged to entertain the design of establishing a bank, the 
l urpo e of which wa to facilitate and increase American 
trade. I\ egotiations were entered upon in Europe and a credit 
• Hut<'hin on, JII., llG-7. 
· Ilut.-hlnson III 253 · Bish l 3- II 202. 
+ Jn Dec i7G5 " rra ' k op, " 13: Weeden II 719 · Scharf, " mY ~ Invoice for m ncoc, wrote to bis Londo;, agents:' "Yo11 have !ta· 
tlons wbkh ltns~~bn'ih!~PPly Of goods under the following lim Jn 
case' there Is a r 1 you strictly comply with, viz. . · ·d bY ~Iarshall the seve~~1a ai~rcl~~e 1~ttg1P 1 Act, you wl!I please to s~n ha Ve 
wrote for this In 0 Id ti e nclosed Invoice. . . · t nlv 
the Principal Mercbcag~s lr~ .0d of the United Resolves of no of 0 the 
other trading towns of this 1 i er1 Of this Town but of tbo.se lned to 
abide by. I Will not Im ort rov nee, & which J am deterro Britain 
unless the grievous Burt~en gne. single manufacture of Grea.t to praY 
the favor that If this act be n~t'e.moved, and I have furthea send roe 
all my account & whatever B 1 repealed, you make out an1 111 en-g~:~o; l~t rt~~~n~~ ~~~~Y ~~ P~s~t~le, ma~Y u~ede~.u~b~o ifi,~then&w ~f c~:,~ 
not be a slave to enrich Pl my }) 1n~ss to any advantage 
llutchlnson, HT., ll6-l17 . Weede~cemITen. 71 ,..Bt;,?wn. 103. 
• • ., u, ' 31-40. 
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< -.,t ablished for that purpose, but the approaching Revolution 
prevented the carrying out of the plan.* 
After the repeal of the Stamp Act, there was a rush of 
:.., oods into the colonies and trade with England continued 
" ·ith more or less briskness up to the war. During the year 
1770, and the three years following, the importations were 
particularly heavy and far in excess of demands,t and on 
account of the ill-judged purchases, payment were not so 
nrompt as in previous years. :i: This rush of foreign good 
11·as a drawback to the establishment of manufactures, but on 
the other hand manufacturing was encouraged by the social 
pres ure for the use of American goods, which continued on 
account of the per i tent attitude of England in maintaining 
that she had a right to raise a revenue from the colonie . 
T t was becoming the fashion to wear .\merican goods, and by 
l he t ime of the war, people were generally clothed in domes-
tic manufacture . § 
During the Revolution, commerce and trade were at a 
standstill. The limited capital and the skill of the country 
we.re employed chiefly in those branche of manufacture 
which were immediately ubservient to the war, and the 
system of hou ehold indu try was pre erved and extended. 
The coloni ts had a general confidence in their ability to 
supply the deficiency cau ed by the suspen ion of trade, 
hut "their habitual and compul ory frugality," say Bi hop, 
"alone carried them through the tr'ying occa ion." By 
1780 the industries of the country were in a deplorable con-
dition. "The whole ource of our upplie ," wrote Peletiah 
\Veb ter in that year, "are dying away fast, are le sening to 
an alarming degree, and threaten not a mere scarcity but a 
universal famine, want, and deficiency in a hort time. ~Io t 
people are lessening the bu ine of their everal occupations, 
down to a pitch just sufficient for their pre ent occa ions and 
• Lewis, 13; Morris, Writings: Humner, F. , . F's of Re,· .. 21; chart , 
Westcott. III., 20 6. See also ante page 19. 
t Bishop, I., 3 0. 
+ Ibid. 
§ Weeden, JI., 7 0 et Seq. An lntere ting evidence o! lhe social pressure for 
domestic goods ls to be found In the postscript to the Pennsylvania 
Chronicle !or Feb. J st., 176 . It states that "the enlor cla.. ur 
scholars at the University In Cambridge, have unanimously agrP>d 
to take their degree next commencement, dre sed altogether In the 
manufacture or the country, a resolution which reflects the hlghe•t 
honor on that seat of learning." 
A Bishop I., 306. 
Bishop I., 300. 
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neccss1t1es, and many have wholly thrown up t heir occupa-
tions and live on their dead stock, and few are calcula ting 
their business on any large scale."* 
The state of the continental finances was also deplor-
able. t Instead of being a reservoir to be fed continually 
by revenues, "The continental treasury was peculiar in that 
all streams flowed out from it and none into it."~: The 
people persistently resisted any attempts at taxing them, and 
it became necessary to resort to requisitions and specific sup-
plies. The large and repeated issues of continental currency, 
and the futile attempts to prevent its depreciation added to 
the difficulties. The resort to foreign loans had been carried 
to its utmost limit and by 1781 the powers of the Continental 
Congress to provide means for carrying on the war were 
almost exhausted. 
In the midst of these disordered conditions of private and 
national affairs, Morris, the Minister of Finance, put into 
operation the plan which he had conceived in 1763 and estab-
lished the Bank of North America primarily as an aid to the 
Government, so that when the war closed. there was, as has 
been shown, one modern banking institution in operation in 
the United States. 
Upon the separation of the colonies from Great Britain it 
might be expected that the restrictions on their trade and 
· industry would be withdrawn and that they would be per-
mitted to develop without restraint. The necessity of sup-
plying their own needs during the suspension of trade, and 
the protection offered by the war, had given a start to manu-
factures and other industries requiring more extensive capital 
and banking facilities,~ and it might also be expected that 
the industries of the country would develop rapidly along 
these lines, and that the Bank of North America would be 
quickly followed by other banks arising in response to the 
new industrial requirements. Such was, however, not the 
case. New banks arose very slowly. II The first bank organ-
ized after the war was, as has been shown, the Bank of Massa-
chusetts, in March, 1784. The Bank of Kew York, the next 
• Fifth Essay on Free 'l'radc and Flnan~e. 
t i'lumner, F. & F.'s of Rev., Yo!. I. 
t Sumner, Ilistory, 35. 
§ 'Yeeden, II., 788-797. 
n i\Icl\iaster, II., 30; Sumner, 'History, ('h. II. 
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t• j.,llow. began busin ess in June, 1784, although it did not 
rn ci n a charter un t il 1791. In 1790, the Bank of ::\faryland 
' ' ,ts establi shed, and in 1791 two more were organized, th e 
r;ank of Providence, Rhode Island, and the Bank of the 
Cnited States. Thus, in 1791, ten years after the beginnin ,.., 
\vas made by the Bank of North America, there were on!: 
six hank,, in operation in the United States. During the nex t 
decade . however, banking spread very rapidly throughou t 
the count ry . so that by 1802, there were thirty-three bankin g 
institutions in the United States employed in discounting 
note~ an d bills of exchange.* 
It is necessary to observe closely the changes in the con-
ditions of trade and industry during this period, in order to 
und erstand why American banking developed in this way. 
:\\thoug h the war left the colonies politically independent, 
yet. economically they were not independent, and conditions 
in th e new states and the policy pursued towards them by 
Great Britain, retarded greatly for a time the growth of indus-
tri es, and the development of conditions, which would de-
mand the assistance of banks. 
Great Britain could no longer prevent the rise of manufac-
tures by restrictive measures to be enforced in the states. 
he was . however, loth to give up the idea that she ought to 
retard their growth as much as possible. Consequently, she 
poured her goods upon the new states at such prices and 
C'redit that they could not re ist buying them. She closed 
her own markets to many of their products, enforced odious 
navigation laws, and tried to prevent them from manufactur-
ing for themselves, by passing rigid laws against the exporta-
tion of machinery, and even of plates and plans from which 
the necessary machinery could be made. t As soon as the 
war closed "all pos ibility of succe s in manufacture ," says 
Bishop, "was for a time excluded by the superabundance of 
foreign goods, some of which sold twenty-five per cent 
cheaper than in London."+ Great numbers of English shop-
keepers, trader and factors rushed into the country and 
tempted the merchant to go into debt. f; The Engli h mer-
• Xoah Webst er. Banks. 1 BBlshop, I , 396 ; \Yeeden, II , 8-1 . 
+ !shop, 30:5 . 
§ McMaster, I, 25:5 . 
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chants, believing that trade would soon return to it,; old 
channels, gave unlimited credit and as the colonial merchants 
imported freely, the market soon became overstocked.* 
These heavy imports could not continue, for the natural 
means of payment were again precluded by England's short 
sighted policy of trade restrictions. Heavy import duties were 
laid on all American exports t with the result that the ex-
ports to England remained very small, and since the ports of 
other European countries had so long been closed to American 
hipping, they too furnished little demand for American 
goods.! 
In 1784, England sent to America merchandise amounting 
to 3,700,000 pounds and took only 750,000 pounds worth of 
her products in return,§ and during the fir t three year 
after the war, the export from England to America as shown 
by the English Custom-house books, amounted to 7,590,955 
pounds stt>rling, while the imports from America during the 
~ame peric-.1 were only 2,486,058 pounds. II This tate of 
trade drained the country of its specie and brought about a 
eriou derangement of currency. 
By 1785, the conditions were serious, and complaints 
were loud throughout the country. "Now trade was stag-
nant," aid the grumbler , "and the co:.mtry was being so 
rapidly drained of its pecie that the day seemC'd near at hand 
when the people would not have one joe to rub again t the 
other."** The country was still suffering from the effects 
of the war. The people were weio-hed down by heavy taxes 
and by large debt , national, state and private, and in addi-
tion to all c: these difficulties came a paper money craze in 
1786, which completed the prostration of trade.*** The paper 
money party in each state was strengthened by the fact that 
money was scarce, and "Rag money" was emitted by all t he 
tate except Connecticut and Delaware. The old story of 
• Weeden. II ., 1 . 
t Bishop. I., '.!3;;. 
t llcMaster, I, 20 . 
I Weeden. II., 37 ; J\!c)faster, I., 206. 
A See table In P ltkln, 30. 
"As a cause ot It (the deranged condition or our currency) Gov. llowdin 
assigns extravagant Importations, which leave the balance of trade 
greatly against the commonwealth, and draw the specie to foreign 
ports." Quoted In Felt, 200; See also McMaster I Ch. III. 
•• hl<"l1aster, I., 205. ' ., 
••• See )lc;\Jaster. I., h. III.. especially pp. 281-3, 301. 333. 356: Felt. :201-205; 
~!~~~?: II., h. l; Fiske, Crltlcal Period, h . JV ; n·eeclen, r 1.. Ch. 
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depreciation , disturbed values, and stagnation of trade was 
repeated. Trade was carried on to a large extent by barter. 
The refusal to sell goods except for specie became general, 
and many merchants closed their stores and wholly discon-
tinued their business. With such burdens upon the commu-
nity, monied concerns were unsettled, credit at the lowest 
ebb . and the business of the country almost at a standstill. 
"Cnder the Confederation there seemed no remedy for this 
state of affairs.* The power to regulate Commerce did not 
exist in Congress but remained in the several states, and the 
rivalries and jealousies among the states prevented any united 
action . Navigation acts and tariff acts were passed by some 
of the states, and the people tried to unite to buy no more 
English goods, but since united action could not be obtained 
these retaliatory measures were ineffective, and each state 
continued to regulate commerce according as it seemed to her 
own special interests. No effective retaliation wa possible 
until after the establishment of the Con titution. 
Although the growth of American manufactures was re-
tarded for a time after the war by English restrictive laws, 
and by the rush of English goods, yet these very things pro-
duced as their final results, a stimulus to manufactures. In 
the first place, a trade so unfavorable to the states could not 
continue, and a large part of the manufactured goods needed 
would finally have to be supplied at home. Secondly, the 
American merchants bought more goods than they could sell , 
and consequently more than they could pay for. Thi greatly 
injured their credit with their English agents, and the court 
were filled with suits against delinquent debtors. t The credit 
of the American merchants had also suffered by the dilatory 
payment of the pre-revolutionary debts.:): The treaty of 
peace with England had recognized all private debts on either 
' ide as still binding, and although the faith of the United 
States was distinctly pledged, Congress was unable to carry 
out the provisions of the treaty in thi respect.§ o great 
was the burden of private debts to the merchants of England. 
• See Curtis, Ch. I'.';_ l!'lske, Critical ferlod, 142-156; Weeden, II., 37- 30 · 
Pitkin, 27-33, Afci\Iaster, I., 201. 
t Washington's Writings JX., 464; Pitkin, 31; Bishop, II., 14 ; )frllaster, I; 
Weeden, JI.. 846. 
i Mci\Iaster, 1, 236-238. 
§ Fiske, Critical Period, 28 & 131. 
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rising prosperity.* The 'power to regulate commerce wa:--. 
under the Constitution, delegated to Congress, and effecti\·c 
encouragement could be given to home producers. Although 
Congress did not make use of the power to any extent for 
some time, the effect psychologically was good. The exi:;t-
ence of the power created confidence. The important inven-
tions of labor saving machinery in the latter part of the 
century were a great aid to the growth of manufactures, and 
their development was made ea ier by the fact that the social' 
prejudice against industries of this nature wa fast disap-
pearing with the gradual breakdown of class distinctions. 
It is an interesting fact, that the operatives of the fir t 
factories in the country were largely drawn from the first 
families of the well-to-do country people. It i not neces-
ary for our purpose to o-ive an account of the variou manu-
factures that gained a foothold during this period. It i 
enough to know that the people of the United taes began 
largely to upply their own needs, and gradually to manufac-
ture also for export. t 
The extraordinary prosperity which began in this coun -
try in the waning years of the century was largely due to 
the disordered conditions of Europe.+ The war which 
began between England and France in 1793, and which finally 
involved nearly all of the nations of Europe, made it neces-
ary for a large part of the trade of the world to be carried 
on under neutral flag . The geographical position of the-
1..:-nited tate with reference to the West India islands and 
the familiarity of our merchants with the conditions in the 
\Vest Indies, enabled the Americans to get a large part of 
this carrying trade, the growth of wealth in the country and 
the enterprising spirit of the people, also enabled them to 
engage in trade with the East Indies and other parts of- the 
• See Weeden II., 4 -859; Bancroft VI., 141, et seq. ; Bishop 1. 398 et seq. : 
Firs t Century of the Republic, 40, et seq. ; Taussig, Tariff lllstory ; 
Illll , Early Tariff lllstory. 
t Pitkin, 144, gives the value of goods of domestic manufacture exported, 
from 1803 to l 07, as follows : 
~gil : : : : . : : : : : : : : : : : : : . : : : : : · : : : : : : : : : : : : ~u~u~~ 
1907 ..... .... . .. ..... ...... .. . ... . .•...... :$2,120,000 
~ See McMaster, Pitkin, and Adams. 
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11orld.';' The products of these countries were carried either 
rl1rectly to Europe or brought to the United States and re-
l'xportecl ill . \merican Yessels. vVhile products were carried 
to Europe from different parts of the world, manufactured 
goods were imported from Europe to the United tates and 
again exported to the \''est Indies, South America and other 
countries. :\Jany of the goods thus imported were ubject to 
import duties, and although they were generally entitled to 
a drawback when re-exported, in certain cases no drawback 
was allo\Yecl and the duties paid on importation remained 
in the public treasury. The treasury also derived ome per-
manent reYenue from all dutiable good imported, for three 
and a half per cent was retained on drawbacks. It i difficult 
to ascertain the amount of public revenue obtained in thi· 
way. Pitkin gives tables showing the permanent receipt 
from this trade during the years 1805, l8o6 and 1807. During 
this period, according to the e tables, $5,253,697. 68 wa re-
tain eel by the Treasury.t This amount repre ented a real 
increase of wealth and relieved the people to that extent from 
taxation . for ince these products were not sold in the United 
~tates the people did not pay the import dutie . 
Another. and far more important result of this carrying 
trade was the remarkable increase of tonnage in the United 
~tates.t The registered tonnage nearly doubled in the year-
from 1793 to 1801. In 1793, the registered tonnage employed 
Export of Foreign Produce. F.xport of Domc~tlc Produ"' 
1791. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500,000 1 ,500,000 
1792. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 750,000 1 ,:?50,000 
1793. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,100,000 '.!4.000,000 
1794. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,500,000 26,500,000 
1195. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,500,000 30,5oo.goo8 
1796 .... . ............. 26,300,000 40, 700, 0 
1797 .................. 27,000,000 29, 00.00 
1798 ................. . 33,000,000 2 ,5oo.ogo 
1799 .......... . ....... 45,500,000 33,100,0 0 
1 oo ......... . ........ 39,100.000 s1,ooo.ogg 
1801 .. ................ 46,600,000 47,400,0 
Peace 1802 ....... . .. . .. . .... 35,700.000 36,300,ogg 
of A miens 1803 .................. 13,600,000 42,200,0 
1804 .................. 36,200,000 41,500,ogg 
1805 .................. 53,200,000 :Ngg.g00 1 06 .................. 60,300,000 ·- ' 0 
1807. . . .............. 59.600,000 4 .700,00 I , 
The exports of forei1rn produce are taken from table In Taus gs 
Tariff History. l:l, and the exports of domestic produce are ascer-
tained from figures given In the same table. The development of the 
carrying trade Is shown bv the growth of the exports of foreign pro-
duce. During the years 1798, 1790, 1800 and 1 05-6 & 7, the value of 
the goods re-exported was greater than the value of the domestic ex-
ports. 
t Pitkin, 174. 
~ See table In Chap. XI of Pitkin. 
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in the for~ign trade was, in round numbers, 36;.coo tons. 
and in I8ol it had increased to 718,000 tons. The tonnage 
decreased slightly during the years l8o2, 3-4, when it in-
creased ·again so that in 1807, it amounted to 848.000 tons. 
There was an equally O'reat increase in the tonnage employeci 
in the coasting trade. 
Further evidence of the increased activity in the United 
States following the e tabli hment of the constitution, is to 
be found in the remarkable growth of exports and imports. 
Exports and imports had increased about 500 per cent by 
l8o7.* 
This unprecedented increase of business activity in the 
United tates, ushered in an era of great prosperity, which 
continued until the trade depression following the commence-
ment of commercial restrictions in the latter part of the year 
1807. During this period the increase of wealth both national 
and individual was so great, that, as Pitkin says, ' \ o .c ation 
it i believed had ever increa eel o rapidly in wealth as the 
United tates."t Liancourt, a early as 1797, made note oi 
the increa e of ready capital among the merchants. He says. 
"The capital of the merchants experiences here [New Lon-
don, Conn.] a much smaller augmentation than in any other 
part of America. In the cour e of these last few year it 
has increased about a fifth part,"+ and about alem he 
writes, "All the inhabitants find themselves in a flourishing 
condition ' ' ' all the profits acquired by trade are rei m-
barked in trade, and the accumulation of interest upon in-
terest in ures them a large capital by which they are enabled 
to bear. up against casual lo ses.".' 
• Gross Imports. Gross Exsons. 
1791. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20,200,000 l!l,000, 00 
1792 .................. 31,500,000 20,700,000 
1793 .................. :n,100,000 26,100,000 
17:l4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34,600,000 3:{,000,000 
1795 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69, 750,000 4 ,000,000 
1796....... . .... . ..... 1,400,000 67,000,000 
1797 .. ... ............. 75,400,000 56, 00,000 
179 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68,500,000 61,500,000 
1799 ............ . ... . . 79,000,000 7 ,600,000 
1 00. . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . 91,200.000 71,000,000 
1 01. . . . . . . . . . . ...... 111,300,000 94,000,000 
1 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76,300,000 72,000,000 
1 03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64, 700,000 55, 00,000 
1 04 .................. "5,000,000 77,700,000 
1 05 .................. 1-0,600,000 95,500,000 
1 06 .................. 129,400,000 101,500,000 
' 1 07 . ...... . . ·.· ....... 138,500,000 J 08,30 ,000 
rabies taken from 'J ausslg"s 'l'arlft' mstory, page J '.! . 
t Pitkin, Cb. 33: See also ~1c11aster: and Adams I.. Ch. I. 
i Llancourt II., 305. Llancourt's Informat ion was obtained from t be ollector 
of Customs In ew London. 
f Llancourt, II., 241 
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British capital, which was formerly of uch great assist-
;rnce in conducting the business operations of the country, 
iacl been gradually withdra\\'11 1 and the domestic capital had 
so much increased by 1808, that "what was once a principal 
agent," says Baring, .. is now scarcely felt."* Baring fur-
ther says that, "t he proportion of capital to the demand for 
it has. a-; might be expected, been gradually improving in 
\merica during the last war. Though the legal rate of in-
terest is only 6 per cent, the market rate was from twelve to 
twent} : at prese1~t it is at little more than the legal rate."+ 
These conditions differed greatly from those existing dur-
ing the colonial period, when a large part of the indu trial 
operations of the country were so limited and of uch a 
nature that no large circulating capital was required, and 
when the industries that did require financial assistance were 
almost wholly carried on with foreign capital, credit, and 
banki ng accommodations. -nder those conditions there was. 
not. as we have seen, a sufficient demand, to cause the ri e-
of banking institutions. 'Cnder the new condition where 
inclu trial operations a sumecl larger and more complex pro-
portions, requiring exten ive capital and banking facilities, 
the demand for banking institution was an effective one to 
which a response was quickly given. 
The first banks that were formed proved of great a i t-
ance in facilitating and augmenting the bu iness of the coun-
try, and the financial success of the early banks, e pecially 
of the Bank of _ Torth America, cau eel many other banks to 
spring up in imitation.:j: The rapid growth of banking insti-
tutions beginning in the la t decade of the eighteenth cen-
tury, was not, it is true, due wholly to the legitimate demand 
of trade and indu try, nor were all of the bank formed at 
that time, conducted on good banking principles. 
The large profits earned by the fir t banks, and the vi ion:'-
of easily acquired wealth to be gained from the privilege o! 
issuing bank note , encourag,ed the establishment of a large 
number of nnnece ary banks. Banking became the favorite-
• Raring, 55. 
t Baring, 63. 
t Felt 194. J9i, l!J9: f'lark and Ila!!. '.!35-'.!3i: Lewis, 74-i;;. 
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form of speculation, and a bank mania follo\\ cd \\·ith the 
most disastrous results.* 
It is not necessary for our purpose to carry this investi-
rration further. It is sufficient to know that when industrial 
conditions in the United States demanded the assistance of 
banking institutions, they arose to supply the need. An 
examination of the conditions which later brought about a 
great deal of unsound banking, and caused the multiplica-
tion of bank far in excess of the legitimate demands, does not 
come within the scope of our subject. Commercial banking 
did not arise in this country until the conditions of trade and 
ii1dustry demanded, and when it did arise, it developed in com-
pliance with trade requirements. 
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